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Abstract
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation in terms of an incomplete informa-
tion game and makes a prediction about players’ behavior. The analyst’s model approximately
describes each player’s hierarchies of beliefs over payoff-relevant states, but the true incom-
plete information game may have correlated duplicated belief hierarchies, and the analyst has
no information about the correlation. Under these circumstances, a natural candidate for the
analyst’s prediction is the set of belief-invariant Bayes correlated equilibria (BIBCE) of the
analyst’s incomplete information game. We introduce the concept of robustness for BIBCE:
a subset of BIBCE is robust if every nearby incomplete information game has a BIBCE that
is close to some BIBCE in this set. Our main result provides a sufficient condition for robust-
ness by introducing a generalized potential function of an incomplete information game. A
generalized potential function is a function on the Cartesian product of the set of states and a
covering of the action space which incorporates some information about players’ preferences.
It is associated with a belief-invariant correlating device such that a signal sent to a player is a
subset of the player’s actions, which can be interpreted as a vague prescription to choose some
action from this subset. We show that, for every belief-invariant correlating device that max-
imizes the expected value of a generalized potential function, there exists a BIBCE in which
every player chooses an action from a subset of actions prescribed by the device, and that the
set of such BIBCE is robust, which can differ from the set of potential maximizing BNE.
JEL classification: C72, D82.
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1 Introduction
Consider an analyst who models a strategic situation in terms of an incomplete information game
and makes a prediction about players’ behavior. He believes that his model correctly describes the
probability distribution over the players’ Mertens-Zamir hierarchies of beliefs over payoff-relevant
states (Mertens and Zamir, 1985). However, players may have observed signals generated by an
individually uninformative correlating device (Liu, 2015), which allows the players to correlate
their behavior. In other words, the true incomplete information game may have correlated dupli-
cated belief hierarchies (Ely and Peski, 2006; Dekel et al., 2007). Then, a natural candidate for the
analyst’s prediction is the set of outcomes that can arise in some Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) of
some incomplete information game with the same distribution over belief hierarchies. Liu (2015)
shows that this set of outcomes can be characterized as the set of belief-invariant Bayes correlated
equilibria (BIBCE) of the analyst’s model. A BIBCE is a Bayes correlated equilibrium (BCE)
in which a prescribed action does not reveal any additional information to the player about the
opponents’ types and the payoff-relevant state, thus preserving the player’s belief hierarchy.1
Now imagine that the analyst believes that his model can be slightly different from the true dis-
tribution over belief hierarchies. That is, he believes that the true incomplete information game is
in a “neighborhood” of the class of incomplete information games with the same belief hierarchies
as those in his model. We call such a nearby incomplete information game an ε-elaboration, where
ε ≥ 0 is the distance between the ε-elaboration and the nearest incomplete information game mea-
sured by the maximum difference of probabilities of events. If a BIBCE of the analyst’s model is
not qualitatively different from some BIBCE of every ε-elaboration for sufficiently small ε, then
the analyst will be justified in adopting this BIBCE as one of his prediction in the presence of small
inaccuracies of the analyst’s model. We apply this idea to a set of BIBCE and define the following
set-valued concept: a set of BIBCE is robust if every ε-elaboration has a BIBCE which is close to
some BIBCE in this set for sufficiently small ε.
1A BIBCE was introduced and analyzed by Forges (2006) and Lehrer et al. (2010) under the additional restriction
that action recommendations could not depend upon the state. Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2016) introduced a BCE
as an analyst’s prediction when the analyst could not rule out players having additional payoff-relevant information.
See Liu (2015) and Bergemann and Morris (2017) for more motivation for studying BIBCE and the relation to BCE
and Bergemann and Morris (2019) for further discussion of the relation to other special cases of BCE.
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To illustrate the idea, consider the following game of incomplete information with two players 1
and 2, two actions A and B for each player, and two payoff-relevant states S 1 and S 2 occurring with
equal probability of 1/2, which combines the information structure of an email game of Rubinstein
(1989) and an example discussed in Ely and Peski (2006), Lehrer et al. (2010), and Liu (2015).
Assume that each player’s set of types is a singleton in the analyst’s model; that is, it is common
knowledge that each player has a uniform prior over {S 1, S 2}. The payoffs are summarized in the
following table, where players would be better coordinated by choosing the same actions in state
S 1 and the different actions in state S 2.
S 1 A B
A 1, 1 0, 0
B 0, 0 1, 1
S 2 A B
A 0, 0 1, 1
B 1, 1 0, 0
This game has an infinitely many number of BNE because each player has a single type and the
expected payoff of each player is 1/2 under every action profile. However, none of them is robust.
We demonstrate it by constructing an ε-elaboration with a unique BNE which is not close to any
BNE of the analyst’s model. Let S 3 be another payoff-relevant state with the following payoffs,
where player 1 has a dominant action A and player 2’s payoffs are the same as those in state S 2.
S 3 A B
A 1, 0 1, 1
B 0, 1 0, 0
Let p be a common prior over the product space of the set of payoff-relevant states {S 1, S 2, S 3} and
that of payoff-irrelevant states Ω = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} given by
p(X, ω) =

ε if ω = 0 and X = S 3,
ε(1 − ε)ω if ω ≥ 1 is odd and X = S 1, or if ω ≥ 2 is even and X = S 2,
0 otherwise,
where 0 < ε < 1. Player 1 has an information partition {{0}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, . . .} of Ω; player 2
has an information partition {{0, 1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7}, . . .} of Ω. In the limit as ε goes to zero, it
is common knowledge that each player has a uniform prior over {S 1, S 2}. When ε > 0, however,
it is not the case, and we can iteratively eliminate dominated actions as follows: player 1 with
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{0} chooses a dominant action A; player 2 with {0, 1} chooses B knowing that player 1 chooses A
with probability 1/(2 − ε); player 1 with {1, 2} chooses B knowing that player 2 chooses B with
probability 1/(2−ε), and so on. That is, action profiles surviving iterated elimination of dominated
actions are (A, B) at ω ∈ {4k}∞k=0, (B, B) at ω ∈ {4k + 1}∞k=0, (B, A) at ω ∈ {4k + 2}∞k=0, and (A, A)
at ω ∈ {4k + 3}∞k=0. In the limit as ε goes to zero, players choose (A, A) and (B, B) with equal
probability when S 1 realizes, and (A, B) and (B, A) with equal probability when S 2 realizes, as
summarized in the following table of joint probabilities of actions and states.
S 1 A B
A 1/4 0
B 0 1/4
S 2 A B
A 0 1/4
B 1/4 0
The above joint probability distribution is a BIBCE of the analyst’s model: players receive a
recommendation to play one of their actions A or B according the table, and they know that it is
optimal to accept the recommendation, while they do not learn anything about the state. Thus, the
ε-elaboration has a unique BNE whose outcome is close to this BIBCE and qualitatively different
from any BNE of the analyst’s model. This implies that any BNE is not robust, and this BIBCE
is the only candidate to be robust since it must arise under the ε-elaboration for every ε > 0. To
establish robustness of this BIBCE, we must show that any other ε-elaboration also has a BIBCE
whose outcome is close to it.
The purpose of this paper is to propose the concept of robust BIBCE and provide a sufficient
condition for it. For this purpose, we introduce a generalized potential function of an incomplete
information game, which is an extension of both a potential function of an incomplete informa-
tion game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996; van Heumen et al., 1996) and a generalized potential
function of a complete information game (Morris and Ui, 2005). A generalized potential function
is a function of a payoff-relevant state and a covering of the action space, a collection of subsets
of the action space such that the union of the subsets is the action space. It incorporates some
information about players’ preferences over the collection of subsets at each state. A special case
is a potential function, where each covering is a singleton (i.e. an action profile). A generalized
potential function is associated with a belief-invariant correlating device such that a signal sent
to a player is a subset of the player’s actions, which can be interpreted as a vague prescription to
choose some action from this subset, and a signal does not reveal any additional information about
4
the opponents’ types and payoff-relevant states to the player. We can calculate the expected value
of a generalized potential function with respect to the joint probability distribution of action subsets
and payoff-relevant states induced by a correlating device together with a common prior of an in-
complete information game. We focus on correlating devices that maximize the expected value of
a generalized potential function and call them GP-maximizing correlating devices. By a property
of a generalized potential function, every GP-maximizing correlating device is accompanied by a
BIBCE where every player chooses an action from a prescribed subset of actions. Our main result
states that the set of such BIBCE is robust. In particular, when an incomplete information game has
a potential function, the set of potential maximizing BIBCE is robust. The incomplete information
game in the preceding example has a potential function, which coincides with the identical payoff
function of each player, and it is straightforward to show that the BIBCE discussed above uniquely
maximizes the expected value of the potential function, so it is robust by our main result.
Robustness of BIBCE is essentially an extension of robustness of equilibria in complete infor-
mation games proposed by Kajii andMorris (1997).2 We briefly discuss the connection by focusing
on an incomplete information game where payoff functions are common knowledge, i.e., a com-
plete information game. Our definition of ε-elaborations applied to complete information games is
equivalent to that of Kajii and Morris (1997). In Kajii and Morris (1997), a correlated equilibrium
is said to be robust if every ε-elaboration has a BNE in a neighborhood of the correlated equilib-
rium. It is known that if a complete information game has a potential function, then the set of Nash
equilibria that maximize the expected value of the potential function is robust (Ui, 2001; Morris
and Ui, 2005).3 In our paper, a correlated equilibrium is said to be robust if every ε-elaboration has
a BIBCE in a neighborhood of the correlated equilibrium.4 Thus, our definition of robustness ap-
plied to complete information games is weaker than that of Kajii and Morris (1997). However, as
demonstrated in the above example, a set of potential maximizing BNEmay not be robust, whereas
a set of potential maximizing Nash equilibria is always robust, suggesting qualitative difference be-
2See Kajii and Morris (2020a,b) and Oyama and Takahashi (2020) for more details about recent developments in
the study of robust equilibria of complete information games.
3The concept of robustness in this result is that of Kajii and Morris (2020a), which is slightly weaker than that of
Kajii and Morris (1997).
4Pram (2019) also considers a similar variant of robustness of equilibria in complete information games. See
Section 3.
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tween the robustness exercise in incomplete information games and that in complete information
games.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminary definitions and
results. Section 3 formally defines robust BIBCE. Section 4 introduces a generalized potential
function and provides the main result. Section 5 studies robust BIBCE of supermodular games.
2 Elaborations of incomplete information games
Fix a finite set of players I and a finite set of actions Ai for each player i ∈ I. An incomplete
information game (T,Θ, pi, u) consists of the following elements.
• T = ∏i∈I Ti is an at most countable set of type profiles, where Ti is a set of player i’s types.
• Θ = ∏i∈I Θi is an at most countable set of payoff-relevant states, where Θi is a set of their
components that determine player i’s payoff function.
• pi ∈ ∆(T × Θ) is a common prior.
• u = (ui)i∈I is a payoff function profile, where ui : A × Θ → R is player i’s payoff function
such that ui(·, θ) = ui(·, θ′) if and only if θi = θ′i .
Hereafter, we use C =
∏
i∈I Ci, C−i =
∏
j,iC j, CS =
∏
i∈S Ci, and C−S =
∏
i<S Ci to denote the
Cartesian products of C1,C2, . . . with generic elements c ∈ C, c−i ∈ C−i, cS ∈ CS , and c−S ∈ C−S ,
respectively.
Payoff functions are assumed to be bounded, i.e., supi,a,θ |ui(a, θ)| < ∞. For each i ∈ I, let
T ∗i ⊆ Ti and Θ∗i ⊆ Θi denote the sets of player i’s types and payoff-relevant states on the support of
pi, respectively: T ∗i = {ti ∈ Ti | pi(ti) > 0} and Θ∗i = {θi ∈ Θi | pi(θi)} > 0, where pi(ti) ≡
∑
t−i,θ pi(t, θ)
and pi(θi) ≡ ∑t,θ−i pi(t, θ) are the marginal probabilities. Player i’s belief is given by pi(t−i, θ|ti) ≡
pi(t, θ)/pi(ti) when his type is ti ∈ T ∗i .
Let pi∗ ∈ ∆(T ∗ × Θ∗) and u∗i : A × Θ∗ → R denote the restriction of pi to T ∗ × Θ∗ and that of
ui to A × Θ∗, respectively. Note that (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗) is the minimum representation of (T,Θ, pi, u)
because every player with every type on the support of pi in (T,Θ, pi, u) has the same belief and
payoffs as those in (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗). We say that two incomplete information games (T,Θ, pi, u) and
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(T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) with the same set of players and the same set of actions are equivalent if they have the
same minimum representation.
A decision rule is a mapping σ : T × Θ→ ∆(A), under which players choose an action profile
a ∈ A with a probability σ(a|t, θ) when (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ is realized. Let Σ denote the set of all decision
rules. A decision rule σ together with a common prior pi determines a joint probability distribution
σ◦pi ∈ ∆(A×T ×Θ) given by σ◦pi(a, t, θ) ≡ σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ), which is referred to as a distributional
decision rule. The set of all distributional decision rules Σ ◦ pi ≡ {σ ◦ pi ∈ ∆(A × T × Θ) | σ ∈ Σ}
is readily shown to be a compact subset of a linear space { f ∈ RA×T×Θ | ∑a,t,θ | f (a, t, θ)| < ∞}
with the weak topology, which is metrizable.5 Each distributional decision rule corresponds to an
equivalence class of decision rules, where σ,σ′ ∈ Σ are equivalent if σ◦pi(a, t, θ) = σ′◦pi(a, t, θ) for
all (a, t, θ) ∈ A×T ∗×Θ∗. When we discuss topology of Σ, we identify Σwith Σ◦pi by regarding Σ as
the set of the equivalence classes and considering the isomorphism from the set of the equivalence
classes to Σ ◦ pi.
A decision rule σ is said to be obedient for player i of type ti if∑
a−i, t−i, θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i, t−i, θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) (1)
for all ai, a′i ∈ Ai, or equivalently,∑
a−i, t−i, θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t−i, θ|ti)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i, t−i, θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t−i, θ|ti)ui((a′i , a−i), θ)
if Ti ∈ T ∗i ; that is, this player cannot increase the expected payoff by deviating from the action
prescribed by the decision rule. In particular, if a decision rule σ is obedient for every player of
every type, then σ is simply said to be obedient. An obedient decision rule is referred to as a Bayes
correlated equilibrium (BCE).
A decision rule is belief-invariant if σ ({ai} × A−i| (ti, t−i) , θ) is independent of (t−i, θ) for each
ai ∈ Ai, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ I, or equivalently, there exists a mapping σi : Ti → ∆(Ai) (i.e., player
i’s strategy) such that σi(ai|ti) = σ ({ai} × A−i| (ti, t−i) , θ). Belief-invariance implies that player i’s
action does not reveal any additional information to the player about the opponents’ types and the
state. In other words, from the viewpoint of player i who knows ti and ai, ti is a sufficient statistic
for (t−i, θ). This property has played an important role in the literature on BCE (Forges, 1993,
5See Lemma 6 for more details.
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2006; Lehrer et al., 2010; Liu, 2015). Let ΣBI denote the set of all belief-invariant decision rules.
It is readily shown that ΣBI is a compact subset of Σ.
Note that a strategy profile (σi)i∈I , where σi : Ti → ∆(Ai) is player i’s strategy, is regarded
as a special case of a belief-invariant decision rule given by σ(a|t, θ) = ∏i∈I σi(ai|ti). A strategy
profile (σi)i∈I is said to be a Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) if it is obedient. Clearly, a BNE is a
special case of a belief-invariant BCE (BIBCE). Because a BNE exists in our setting with at most a
countable number of states, types, and actions (Milgrom and Weber, 1985), a BIBCE also exists.6
It is easy to check that the set of all BIBCE has the following property.
Lemma 1. The set of all BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u) is a nonempty convex compact subset of Σ containing
all BNE, where a convex combination ασ + (1 − α)σ′ for σ,σ′ ∈ ΣBI and α ∈ (0, 1) is given by
(ασ + (1 − α)σ′)(a|t, θ) = ασ(a|t, θ) + (1 − α)σ′(a|t, θ)
for all a ∈ A and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ.
We introduce a correlating device. Let Mi be an at most countable set of signals (i.e. messages)
player i receives. The probability distribution of a signal profilem = (mi)i∈I ∈ M ≡ ∏i∈I Mi is given
by a mapping ρ : T × Θ → ∆(M), under which m ∈ M is drawn with a probability ρ(m|t, θ) when
(t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ is realized. This mapping ρ is referred to as a communication rule. Belief-invariance
of a communication rule is defined similarly. That is, ρ is belief-invariant if ρ ({mi} × M−i| (ti, t−i) , θ)
is independent of (t−i, θ) for each mi ∈ Mi, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ I, which implies that a signal received
by player i does not reveal any additional information to the player about the opponents’ types and
the state.
Combining an incomplete information game (T,Θ, pi, u) and a communication rule ρ, we can
construct another incomplete information game (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) with the same sets of players and ac-
tions such that T¯i = Ti × Mi for each i ∈ I and p¯i(t¯, θ) = pi(t, θ)ρ(m|t, θ) for each t¯ = ((ti,mi))i∈I ∈ T¯
and θ ∈ Θ. This incomplete information game is referred to as the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u)
and ρ. Note that player i in (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) receives mi as well as ti, where ti is drawn according to
pi and mi is drawn according to ρ, and if ρ is belief-invariant, then this player’s knowledge about
(t−i, θ) is exactly the same as that in the original game (T,Θ, pi, u). Using the conjunction when ρ
is belief-invariant, we define an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u).
6ABIBCE is also a solution to a linear programming problem with a countable number of variables and constraints.
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Definition 1. An incomplete information game (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u) if there
exist a belief-invariant communication rule ρ and mappings τi : T¯i → Ti and µi : T¯i → Mi for each
i ∈ I such that the mapping t¯i 7→ (τi(t¯i), µi(t¯i)) restricted to T¯ ∗ is one-to-one and
p¯i(t¯, θ) = pi(τ(t¯), θ)ρ(µ(t¯)|τ(t¯), θ) for all t¯ ∈ T¯ , (2)
where τ(t¯) = (τi(t¯i))i∈I and µ(t¯) = (µi(t¯i))i∈I .
Equation (2) implicitly requires that
∑
t¯∈τ−1(t) ρ(µ(t¯)|t, θ) = 1 for all (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ × Θ∗ and τ(T¯ ∗) =
T ∗ because p¯i(T¯ × Θ) = 1.
For example, if (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and a belief-invariant communi-
cation rule ρ, then it is an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u) with τi and µi given by τi(ti,mi) = ti and
µi(ti,mi) = mi for all t¯i = (ti,mi) ∈ T¯i and i ∈ I. Note that (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is an elaboration of
(T,Θ, pi, u) if and only if it is isomorphic to a conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and some belief-invariant
communication rule.
As the next lemma shows, we can provide a necessary and sufficient condition for an elabora-
tion without using a communication rule.
Lemma 2. An incomplete information game (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u) if and only
if, for each i ∈ I, there exists a mapping τi : T¯i → Ti such that
p¯i(τ−1(t), θ) = pi(t, θ) for all (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ × Θ∗, (3)
p¯i(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|t¯i) = pi(t−i, θ|τi(t¯i)) for all t¯i ∈ T¯ ∗i and (t−i, θ) ∈ T ∗−i × Θ∗, (4)
where τ−1i (ti) = {t¯i ∈ T¯i | τi(t¯i) = ti}, τ−1(t) =
∏
i∈I τ−1i (ti), and τ
−1
−i (t−i) =
∏
j,i τ
−1
j (t j).
Proof. To show the “if” part, suppose that, for each i ∈ I, there exists a mapping τi : T¯i → Ti
satisfying (3) and (4). Let Mi = T¯i and µi : T¯i → Mi be such that µi(t¯i) = t¯i for all t¯i ∈ T¯i, by which
the mapping t¯i 7→ (τi(t¯i), µi(t¯i)) is one-to-one. Consider a communication rule ρ : T × Θ → ∆(M)
satisfying (2); that is, ρ(t¯|t, θ)pi(t, θ) = p¯i(t¯, θ) if τ(t¯) = t and ρ(t¯|t, θ) = 0 otherwise, which is
well-defined by (3). Then, for (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ × Θ∗ and t¯i ∈ T¯ ∗i with ti = τi(t¯i),
ρ({t¯i} × T¯−i|t, θ) = ρ({t¯i} × τ−1−i (t−i)|t, θ) =
p¯i({t¯i} × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)
pi(t, θ)
=
p¯i(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|t¯i) × p¯i(t¯i)
pi(t−i, θ|ti) × pi(ti) =
p¯i(t¯i)
pi(ti)
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by (4). Because ρ({t¯i} × T¯−i|t, θ) = p¯i(t¯i)/pi(ti) is independent of t−i and θ, ρ is a belief-invariant
communication rule, and thus (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u).
To show the “only if” part, suppose that (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u); that is,
there exists a belief-invariant communication rule ρ and mappings τi : T¯i → Ti and µi : T¯i → Mi
for each i ∈ I satisfying the condition in Definition 1. It is enough to show that τ and p¯i satisfy (3)
and (4). Let (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ × Θ∗ and t¯i ∈ T¯i be such that τi(t¯i) = ti. By (2),
p¯i(τ−1(t), θ) = pi(t, θ)
∑
t¯:τ(t¯)=t
ρ(µ(t¯)|t, θ) = pi(t, θ).
Thus, (3) holds. Moreover, by (2) again,
p¯i(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|t¯i) =
p¯i({t¯i} × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)∑
t′−i,θ′ p¯i({t¯i} × τ−1−i (t′−i), θ′)
=
pi(t, θ)
(∑
t¯−i:τ−i(t¯−i)=t−i ρ(µ(t¯)|t, θ)
)
∑
t′−i,θ′ pi((ti, t
′
−i), θ′)
(∑
t¯−i:τ−i(t¯−i)=t′−i ρ(µ(t¯)|(ti, t′−i), θ′)
)
=
pi(t, θ)∑
t′−i,θ′ pi((ti, t
′
−i), θ′)
= pi(t, θ|ti),
where the third equality holds because∑
t¯−i:τ−i(t¯−i)=t−i
ρ(µ(t¯)|t, θ) =
∑
m−i∈M−i
ρ((µi(t¯i),m−i)|t, θ) = ρ({µi(t¯i)} × M−i|t, θ)
is independent of t−i and θ by the belief-invariance of ρ. Thus, (4) holds. □
The mapping τ in Lemma 2, which connects an elaboration to the original incomplete infor-
mation game, is referred to as an elaboration mapping.
Consider the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and a belief-invariant communication rule ρ. For a
strategy profile σ¯ = (σ¯i)i∈I of the conjunction, where σ¯i : Ti ×Mi → ∆(Ai), let σ be a decision rule
of (T,Θ, pi, u) given by
σ(a|t, θ) =
∑
m∈M
∏
i∈I
σ¯i(ai|ti,mi)ρ(m|t, θ),
which is referred to as a decision rule induced by σ¯ and ρ. Then,
σ({ai} × A−i|t, θ) =
∑
mi∈Mi
σ¯i(ai|ti,mi)ρ({mi} × M−i|t, θ)
is independent of (t−i, θ) because ρ is belief-invariant; that is, the induced decision rule is belief-
invariant. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if σ¯ is obedient, then σ is also obedient; that
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is, the induced decision rule is a BIBCE. The next proposition not only generalizes this observation
but also establishes its converse; that is, the set of all BIBCE of an incomplete information game
coincides with the set of all BNE of all elaborations of the incomplete information game (Liu,
2015).
Proposition 1. If σ is a BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u), then there exists an elaboration (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) with an
elaboration mapping τ and its BNE σ¯ satisfying
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ) =
∑
t¯∈τ−1(t)
∏
i∈I
σ¯i(ai|t¯i)p¯i(t¯, θ) (5)
for all a ∈ A and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ. If σ¯ is a BIBCE of an elaboration (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u), then σ satisfying
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ) =
∑
t¯∈τ−1(t)
σ¯(a|t¯, θ)p¯i(t¯, θ) (6)
for all a ∈ A and (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ is a BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u). In particular, σ is a BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u)
if and only if there exists an elaboration (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) and its BNE σ¯ satisfying (5).
Proof. Liu (2015) establishes the equivalence of BNE of an incomplete information game and
BIBCE of the conjunctions of the incomplete information game and belief-invariant communica-
tion rules when T and M are finite sets. Proposition 1 is a straightforward extension of his result,
where we add the formulae (5) and (6). We provide a proof for completeness.
To establish the first part, let σ be a BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u). Construct a communication rule ρ as
follows: Mi = Ai for each i ∈ I and ρ(a|t, θ) = σ(a|t, θ) for each a ∈ A and (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ. Note that
ρ is belief-invariant because σ is belief-invariant. Let (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) be the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u)
and ρ, where p¯i(t¯, θ) = pi(t, θ)ρ(a|t, θ) if t¯ = ((ti, ai))i∈I ∈ T¯ . Consider a strategy σ¯i : T¯i → ∆(Ai)
such that σ¯i(ai|t¯i) = 1 if t¯i = (ti, ai) and σ¯i(ai|t¯i) = 0 otherwise. Then,
∏
i∈I
σ¯i(ai|t¯i)p¯i(t¯, θ) =

σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ) if t¯ = ((ti, ai))i∈I ,
0 if t¯ , ((ti, ai))i∈I ,
which implies (5). Thus, for each i ∈ I and t¯i = (ti, bi) ∈ T¯i,
∑
a−i,t¯−i,θ
∏
j∈I
σ¯ j(a j|t¯ j)p¯i(t¯, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) =

∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) if bi = ai,
0 if bi , ai,
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which implies that σ¯ is obedient because σ is obedient. Therefore, σ¯ is a BNE of (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u),
which is also an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u).
To establish the second part, let σ¯ be a BIBCE of (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u). Without loss of generality, we
can assume that (T¯ ,Θ, p¯i, u) is the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and a belief-invariant communication
rule ρ : T × Θ→ M. Then, for a decision rule σ of (T,Θ, pi, u) satisfying (6), if pi(t, θ) > 0, then
σ({ai} × A−i|t, θ) =
∑
t¯∈τ−1(t)
σ¯({ai} × A−i|t¯, θ)p¯i(t¯, θ)/pi(t, θ)
=
∑
t¯∈τ−1(t) σ¯i(ai|t¯i)p¯i(t¯, θ)
pi(t, θ)
=
∑
m∈M σ¯i(ai|ti,mi)pi(t, θ)ρ(m|t, θ)
pi(t, θ)
=
∑
mi∈Mi
σ¯i(ai|ti,mi)ρ({mi} × M−i|t, θ),
which is independent of (t−i, θ) because ρ is belief-invariant. Thus, σ is belief-invariant. Moreover,
by (6), ∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui(a, θ) =
∑
a−i,t−i,θ
∑
t¯∈τ−1(t)
σ¯(a|t¯, θ)p¯i(t¯, θ)ui(a, θ)
=
∑
t¯i∈τ−1i (ti)
∑
a−i, t¯−i, θ
σ¯(a|t¯, θ)p¯i(t¯, θ)ui(a, θ),
which implies that σ is obedient because σ¯ is obedient. Consequently, σ is a BIBCE. □
Before closing this section, we introduce another representation of decision and communica-
tion rules, which will be used when we discuss our main result. In the above discussion, we regard
the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and ρ as an incomplete incomplete information game, so a decision
rule of the conjunction is defined as a mapping σ¯ :
∏
i∈I(Ti×Mi)×Θ→ ∆(A). Instead of consider-
ingσ and ρ separately, we can also use a mapping γ : T×Θ→ ∆(A×M) to represent a decision rule
and a communication rule simultaneously, which is referred to as a decision-communication rule.
A decision rule σ together with a communication rule ρ determines a decision-communication rule
by γ(a,m|t, θ) = σ(a|(ti,mi)i∈I , θ)ρ(m|t, θ) for all (a,m) ∈ A × M and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ. Conversely,
a decision-communication rule γ determines a communication rule ρ(m|t, θ) = γ(A × {m}|t, θ) and
a decision rule σ(a|(ti,mi)i∈I , θ) = γ(a,m|t, θ)/ρ(m|t, θ) for all (a,m) ∈ A × M and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ
with ρ(m|t, θ) > 0. We say that γ is obedient for player i with (ti,mi) if the induced decision
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rule σ is obedient for this player of this type in the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and the induced
communication rule ρ; that is,∑
a−i,m−i, t−i, θ
γ(a,m|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i,m−i, t−i, θ
γ(a,m|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) (7)
for all ai, a′i ∈ Ai. We simply say that γ is obedient if it is obedient for every player of every
type. Belief-invariance of a decision-communication rule is defined similarly: γ is belief-invariant
if γ({ai}×A−i×{mi}×M−i|t, θ) is independent of t−i and θ for all (ai,mi) ∈ Ai×Mi, ti ∈ Ti, and i ∈ I;
that is, there exists γi : Ti → ∆(Ai × Mi) such that γi(ai,mi|ti) = γ({ai} × A−i × {mi} × M−i|t, θ). It is
straightforward to show that if σ and ρ determined by γ are belief-invariant, then γ is also belief-
invariant. An obedient belief-invariant decision-communication rule is referred to as a BIBCE with
a communication rule (BIBCE-C). A BIBCE-C directly induces a BIBCE in the following sense.
Lemma 3. If a belief-invariant decision-communication rule γ is a BIBCE-C, then σ ∈ ΣBI with
σ(a|t, θ) = γ({a} × M|t, θ) for all (a, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ is a BIBCE.
Proof. Let γ be a BIBCE-C. Because γ is obedient, (7) holds. By taking the summation of each
side of (7) over mi ∈ Mi, we obtain∑
a−i, t−i, θ
γ({a} × M|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i, t−i, θ
γ({a} × M|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ).
Thus, σ is obedient. In addition, because γ is belief-invariant, γ({ai} × A−i × {mi} × M−i|t, θ) =
γi(ai,mi|ti), which implies σ({ai}×A−i|t, θ) = ∑mi∈Mi γi(ai,mi|ti). Thus, σ is belief-invariant as well;
that is, σ is a BIBCE. □
3 ε-Elaborations and robustness
We define an ε-elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u), which is approximately an elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u).
Definition 2. For ε ≥ 0, an incomplete information game (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε-elaboration of
(T,Θ, pi, u) if the following condition is satisfied.
1. Θ∗ ⊆ Θ¯ and u¯i(·, θ) = ui(·, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ∗.
2. p¯i(T¯ ♯) ≥ 1 − ε, where T¯ ♯ = ∏i∈I T¯ ♯i and T¯ ♯i = {t¯i ∈ T¯i | p¯i(Θ∗i × Θ¯−i|t¯i) = 1}.
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3. There exist a mapping τi : T¯i → Ti and T¯ ♭i ⊆ T¯i with p¯i(T¯ ♭i ) ≥ 1 − ε such that
sup
E⊆T×Θ
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t,θ)∈E
p¯i(τ−1(t), θ) −
∑
(t,θ)∈E
pi(t, θ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, (8)
sup
E−i⊆T−i×Θ
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t−i,θ)∈E−i
p¯i(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|t¯i) −
∑
(t−i,θ)∈E−i
pi(t−i, θ|τi(t¯i))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε for all t¯i ∈ T¯ ♭i . (9)
The set of payoff-relevant states in an ε-elaboration includes that in the underlying incomplete
information game by the first condition. All players in an ε-elaboration have the same payoff
functions as those in the underlying incomplete information game with probability greater than
1 − ε by the second condition. The third condition means that if ε = 0 then an ε-elaboration
is an elaboration with an elaboration mapping τ by Lemma 2. We also call τ in Definition 2 an
elaboration mapping. It is straightforward to verify that the example of an ε-elaboration discussed
in the introduction satisfies the condition in Definition 2.
As a special case, let T = T ∗ = {t} and Θ = Θ∗ = {θ}, which are singletons. Then, (T,Θ, pi, u) is
a complete information game with a payoff function profile (ui(·, θ))i∈I . Kajii and Morris (1997) de-
fine an ε-elaboration of a complete information game: an incomplete information game (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯)
is an ε-elaboration of the complete information game if p¯i(T¯ ♯) = 1−ε; that is, with probability 1−ε,
every player knows that his payoff function is that of the complete information game. The follow-
ing proposition establishes the equivalence of Definition 2 and the definition of Kajii and Morris
(1997) when we focus on complete information games.
Proposition 2. Suppose that T = T ∗ = {t} and Θ = Θ∗ = {θ}. If (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε-elaboration
in the sense of Definition 2, then there exists ε′ > 0 such that (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε′-elaboration in
the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997). Conversely if (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε-elaboration in the sense of
Kajii and Morris (1997), then there exists ε′ > 0 such that (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε′-elaboration in the
sense of Definition 2.
Proof. Suppose that (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε-elaboration in the sense of Definition 2. Then, it is clear
that (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε′-elaboration in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) with ε′ ≡ 1−pi(T¯ ♯) ≤ ε.
Suppose that (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is an ε-elaboration in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997). Then,
p¯i(θ) ≥ p¯i(T¯ ♯) = 1 − ε, and thus |p¯i(τ−1(t), θ) − pi(t, θ)| = |p¯i(θ) − 1| ≤ ε ≤ √ε, where τi : T¯i → {t}.
Thus, (8) holds with ε replaced by
√
ε. Let T¯ ♭i = {t¯i ∈ T¯i | p¯i(θ|t¯i) ≥ 1 −
√
ε}. Then, for all t¯i ∈ T¯ ♭i ,
|p¯i(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|t¯i) − pi(t−i, θ|τi(t¯i))| = |p¯i(θ|t¯i) − pi(θ|τi(t¯i))| = |p¯i(θ|t¯i) − 1| ≤
√
ε,
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and thus (9) holds with ε replaced by
√
ε. Moreover, we must have p¯i(T¯ ♭i ) ≥ 1 −
√
ε because
1− ε ≤ p¯i(θ) =
∑
t¯i∈T¯ ♭i
p¯i(θ|t¯i)p¯i(t¯i)+
∑
t¯i<T¯ ♭i
p¯i(θ|t¯i)p¯i(t¯i) ≤ p¯i(T¯ ♭i )+ (1−
√
ε)(1− p¯i(T¯ ♭i )) =
√
εp¯i(T¯ ♭i )+ 1−
√
ε.
Therefore, (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is a
√
ε-elaboration in the sense of Definition 2. □
We say that a set of BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u) is robust if every ε-elaboration has a BIBCE which
is close to some BIBCE in this set.
Definition 3. A set of BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u), E ⊆ ΣBI , is robust if, for every δ > 0, there exists
ε¯ > 0 such that, for all ε ≤ ε¯, every ε-elaboration (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) with an elaboration mapping τ has a
BIBCE σ¯ such that
sup
E⊆A×T×Θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑(a,t,θ)∈E σ¯ ◦ p¯i(a, τ−1(t), θ) −
∑
(a,t,θ)∈E
σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ (10)
for some σ ∈ E, where σ¯ ◦ p¯i(a, t¯, θ) = σ¯(a|t¯, θ)p¯i(t¯, θ) and σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ) = σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ). Equiva-
lently, E is robust if every sequence of εk-elaborations {(T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k)}∞k=1 with limk→∞ εk = 0 has
a sequence of BIBCE {σ¯k}∞k=1 such that
lim
k→∞
inf
σ∈E
sup
E⊆A×T×Θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑(a,t,θ)∈E σ¯k ◦ p¯ik(a, (τk)−1(t), θ) −
∑
(a,t,θ)∈E
σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0, (11)
where τk is an elaboration mapping of (T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k) and (τk)−1(t) is the inverse image of t ∈ T .
Robustness is defined in terms of a distributional decision rule σ ◦ pi. Thus, a set of BIBCE
of (T,Θ, pi, u), E ⊆ ΣBI , is robust if and only if the corresponding set of BIBCE of the minimum
representation (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗),
E∗ = {σ∗ : T ∗ × Θ∗ → ∆(A) | σ∗ is a restriction of σ ∈ E to T ∗ × Θ∗},
is robust. We use this observation to prove our main result in the next section.
Robustness of BIBCE is essentially an extension of robustness of correlated equilibria in com-
plete information games due to Kajii and Morris (1997). However, there is a difference: we adopt
BIBCE as a solution concept for ε-elaborations, whereas Kajii and Morris (1997) adopt BNE. To
see the difference in more detail, let us compare Definition 3 and the definition of a set-valued
version of robustness in complete information games due to Morris and Ui (2005). In Morris and
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Ui (2005), T and Θ are singletons, and a set of correlated equilibria E, which is also a set of BNE
of elaborations, is said to be robust if every sequence of εk-elaborations {(T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k)}∞k=1 with
limk→∞ εk = 0 has a sequence of BNE satisfying (11). When a set of correlated equilibria is a sin-
gleton, a robust set is reduced to a robust equilibrium in Kajii and Morris (1997). Recently, Pram
(2019) replaces BNE used in ε-elaborations in Kajii and Morris (1997) with an agent normal form
BCE, where a prescribed action to each player of each type is independent of the opponents’ types
and the payoff-relevant state. Thus, when T and Θ are singletons, the requirement of robustness
in Definition 3 is weaker than those in Kajii and Morris (1997), Morris and Ui (2005), and Pram
(2019).
Let us explain why we adopt BIBCE by coming back to the example discussed in the intro-
duction. We have demonstrated that there exists an ε-elaboration with a unique BNE. The BNE
is close to the BIBCE of the analyst’s model when ε is small, but it is not close to any BNE of
the analyst’s model. This implies that there is no robust BNE of the analyst’s model, which ex-
plains why we are interested in robust BIBCE rather than robust BNE. Then, a solution concept
for ε-elaborations must also be BIBCE because any BNE of an ε-elaboration may not be close to a
BIBCE of the analyst model even if ε = 0. For example, every BNE of the analyst’s model in the
example, which is a 0-elaboration, is quite different form the BIBCE.
4 Main results
4.1 Generalized potentials
To provide a sufficient condition for robustness, we introduce a generalized potential function of
an incomplete information game, which is an extension of a generalized potential function of a
complete information game (Morris and Ui, 2005).
We first discuss a potential function in an incomplete information game (Monderer and Shap-
ley, 1996; van Heumen et al., 1996; Ui, 2009), which is a special case of a generalized potential
function. A function v : A × Θ → R is a potential function of an incomplete information game
(T,Θ, pi, u) if, for each θ ∈ Θ∗, v(·, θ) is a potential function of the ex-post game given by a payoff
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function profile (ui(·, θ))i∈I; that is,
ui(a, θ) − ui((a′i , a−i), θ) = v(a, θ) − v((a′i , a−i), θ) (12)
for all ai, a′i ∈ Ai, a−i ∈ A−i, i ∈ I, and θ ∈ Θ∗. It is well known that v is a potential function if and
only if there exists qi : A−i × Θ → R such that ui(a, θ) = v(a, θ) + qi(a−i, θ) for all i ∈ I, a ∈ A, and
θ ∈ Θ∗. Thus, (1) is equivalent to∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v((a′i , a−i), θ). (13)
That is, σ is obedient in (T,Θ, pi, u) if and only if σ is obedient in (T,Θ, pi, u′) with u′i = v for all
i ∈ I, which is an incomplete information game with an identical payoff function v. This implies
that if a belief-invariant decision rule σ ∈ ΣBI maximizes the expected value of the potential
function, i.e., σ ∈ argmaxσ′∈ΣBI ∑a,t,θ σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)v(a, θ), then σ is a BIBCE.
To introduce a generalized potential function, letAi ⊆ 2Ai\∅ be a covering of Ai for each i ∈ I;
that is,Ai is a collection of nonempty subsets of Ai such that ⋃Xi∈Ai Xi = Ai. Each Xi ∈ Ai will be
interpreted as a signal to player i which vaguely prescribes actions in Xi. We write A = {X | X =∏
i∈I Xi, Xi ∈ Ai} andA−i = {X−i | X−i = ∏ j,i X j, X j ∈ A j}.
Definition 4. A bounded function F : A×Θ→ R is a generalized potential function of (T,Θ, pi, u)
if, for each i ∈ I and Pi ∈ ∆(A−i ×A−i ×Θ) such that Pi(A−i ×A−i ×Θ∗) = 1 and Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) = 0
whenever a−i < X−i,
Xi ∈ arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
X−i,θ
Pi(X−i, θ)F((X′i , X−i), θ) (14)
implies
Xi ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) , ∅, (15)
where Pi(X−i, θ) =
∑
a−i∈A−i Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) and Pi(a−i, θ) =
∑
X−i∈A−i Pi(a−i, X−i, θ).
In the above definition, Pi is interpreted as player i’s belief that X−i ∈ A−i and θ ∈ Θ are
drawn with probability P(X−i, θ), and then a−i ∈ X−i is drawn with probability Pi(a−i|X−i, θ) =
Pi(a−i, X−i, θ)/P(X−i, θ), where the opponents never choose a−i < X−i because Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) = 0
if a−i < X−i. The definition implies that if Xi is optimal with respect to the expected value of a
generalized potential function F then some action in Xi is optimal with respect to the expected
value of player i’s payoff function ui.
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At the extreme, consider F : A × Θ → R such that Ai = {Ai} for each i ∈ I. Note that
A = {{A}}. Clearly, every incomplete information game has a generalized potential function of this
(trivial) type. At the other extreme, consider F : A × Θ → R such that Ai = {{ai} | ai ∈ Ai} for
each i ∈ I. Note thatA = {{a} | a ∈ A}. For example, a potential function is a generalized potential
function of this type, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 4. Suppose that v : A×Θ→ R is a potential function of (T,Θ, pi, u). Then, F : A×Θ→ R
withAi = {{ai} | ai ∈ Ai} for each i ∈ I and F({a}, θ) = v(a, θ) for each (a, θ) ∈ A×Θ is a generalized
potential function of (T,Θ, pi, u).
Proof. We show that F satisfies the condition in Definition 4. We can rewrite (14) and (15) as
follows:
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,θ
Pi({a−i}, θ)v((a′i , a−i), θ), (16)
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ). (17)
Note that Pi(a−i, θ) = Pi({a−i}, θ) since Pi(a−i, {a′−i}, θ) = 0 if a−i , a′−i. Thus, (16) is equivalent to
(17) by (12), which implies that F is a generalized potential function. □
4.2 Robustness of GP-maximizing BIBCE
We regard Ai as a set of signals player i receives and consider a decision-communication rule
γ : T × Θ → ∆(A × A). We say that γ is A-consistent if γ(a, X|t, θ) = 0 whenever a < X;
that is, player i receiving Xi always chooses some ai ∈ Xi. If A = {{a} | a ∈ A}, then A-
consistency implies that γ(a, {a′}|t, θ) = 0 whenever a , a′, so γ is equivalent to a decision rule
σ with σ(a|t, θ) = γ(a, {a}|t, θ). In the remainder of this paper, every decision-communication rule
with a signal space A is assumed to be A-consistent. Let ΓBI denote the set of all (A-consistent)
belief-invariant decision-communication rules. For each γ ∈ ΓBI , we use the following notation:
γ(a|t, θ) = ∑X∈A γ(a, X|t, θ), γ(X|t, θ) = ∑a∈A γ(a, X|t, θ), γi(ai, Xi|ti) = ∑(a−i,X−i)∈A−i×A−i γ(a, X|t, θ),
γi(ai|ti) = ∑Xi∈Ai γi(ai, Xi|ti), and γi(Xi|ti) = ∑ai∈Ai γi(ai, Xi|ti). Note that γi does not depend upon
(t−i, θ) because γ is belief-invariant. Each γ ∈ ΓBI together with a prior pi determines a joint
probability distribution γ ◦ pi ∈ ∆(A × A × T × Θ) given by γ ◦ pi(a, X, t, θ) = γ(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ),
which is referred to as a distributional decision-communication rule. We use ΓBI ◦ pi = {γ ◦ pi ∈
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∆(A × A × T × Θ) | γ ∈ ΓBI} to denote the set of all distributional (A-consistent) belief-invariant
decision-communication rules.
Let ΓF ⊂ ΓBI denote the set of belief-invariant decision-communication rules that maximize
the expected value of a generalized potential function F:
ΓF ≡ argmax
γ∈ΓBI
∑
X,t,θ
γ(X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F(X, θ).
Then, ΓF contains a BIBCE-C, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 5. There exists a BIBCE-C γ ∈ ΓF .
Proof. It can be readily shown that ΓBI ◦ pi is a compact set in the weak topology (see Lemma 6 in
the next subsection). Thus,
ΓF ◦ pi ≡ arg max
γ◦pi∈Γ◦pi
∑
a,X,t,θ
γ ◦ pi(a, X, t, θ)F(X, θ)
is nonempty, and ΓF is also nonempty. Note that, for any γ ∈ ΓF , Xi ∈ Ai, and ti ∈ Ti with
γi(Xi|ti) > 0, it holds that
Xi ∈ arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
a, X−i, t−i, θ
γ(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F((X′i , X−i), θ), (18)
which implies that
Xi ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a, X−i, t−i, θ
γ(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) , ∅ (19)
by Definition 4, where we consider Pi ∈ ∆(A−i ×A−i × Θ) given by
Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) =
∑
ai∈Ai, t−i∈T−i
γ(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)/
∑
a′∈A, X−i∈A−i, t−i∈T−i, θ′∈Θ
γ(a′, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ′).
Fix γ ∈ ΓF and let ρ : T × Θ → ∆(A) be a communication rule with ρ(X|t, θ) = γ(X|t, θ).
Consider the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and ρ and let ΣAi be the set of player i’s strategies in the
conjunction that always assign some ai ∈ Xi whenever player i receives Xi ∈ Ai:
ΣAi = {σi : Ti ×Ai → ∆(Ai) | σi(ai|ti, Xi) = 0 whenever ai < Xi}.
Note that a decision-communication rule induced by ρ and a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I ∈ ΣA,
which is given by σ ⊗ ρ(a, X|t, θ) ≡ ∏i∈I σi(ai|ti, Xi)ρ(X|t, θ), is an element of ΓF because σ ⊗
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ρ(a, X|t, θ) = 0 if a < X and σ ⊗ ρ(X|t, θ) = ρ(X|t, θ) = γ(X|t, θ). Thus, for any σ−i ∈ ΣA−i, Xi ∈ Ai,
and ti ∈ Ti with γi(Xi|ti) > 0, it holds that
Xi ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i, X−i, t−i, θ
∏
j,i
σ j(a j|t j, X j)ρ(X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui(a′i , a−i) , ∅
by (19). In other words, for any σ−i ∈ ΣA−i, there is σ′i ∈ ΣAi that is a best response to σ−i, and thus
the best response correspondence Ψ : ΣA ⇒ ΣA given by
Ψ(σ) = {σ′ ∈ ΣA | for each i ∈ I and (ti, Xi) ∈ Ti ×Ai, (σ′i , σ−i) is obedient for player i of type (ti, Xi)}
is nonempty-valued. Moreover, it is readily shown that it is convex-valued and has a closed graph.
Therefore, Ψ has a fixed point σ∗ ∈ ΣA, which is a BNE of the conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and ρ.
This implies that σ∗ ⊗ ρ ∈ ΓF is a BIBCE-C of (T,Θ, pi, u). □
If γ ∈ ΓF is a BIBCE-C, then σ ∈ ΣBI with σ(a|t, θ) = γ(a|t, θ) is a BIBCE by Lemma 3. Such a
BIBCE is referred to as a GP-maximizing BIBCE. We denote the set of all GP-maximizing BIBCE
by
EF ≡ {σ ∈ ΣBI | γ ∈ ΓF is a BIBCE-C and σ(a|t, θ) = γ(a|t, θ)}.
In the following main result of this paper, we show that EF is a robust set.
Theorem 1. If (T,Θ, pi, u) has a generalized potential function F : A × Θ → R, then EF is
nonempty and robust.
If the domain of a generalized potential function isA = {{A}}, then EF is the set of all BIBCE.
In general, EF is not always a minimal robust set, and Theorem 1 is useful only when we have a
non-trivial generalized potential function.
For example, if an incomplete information game has a potential function v : A×Θ→ R, it also
has a generalized potential function F : A× Θ→ R withA = {{a} | a ∈ A} and F({a}, θ) = v(a, θ)
by Lemma 4, and it is straightforward to show that
EF = Σv ≡ arg max
σ∈ΣBI
∑
a,t,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a|t, θ),
which is the set of potential maximizing BIBCE. Thus, we obtain the following corollary of The-
orem 1.
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Corollary 2. If (T,Θ, pi, u) has a potential function v : A×Θ→ R, then Σv is nonempty and robust.
As an application of this corollary, consider the example discussed in the introduction, which
has an identical payoff function, i.e., a potential function. To calculate a potential maximizing
BIBCE, we represent a decision rule in terms of the following table of a joint probability of an
action profile and a state, where p1 + q1 + r1 + s1 = p2 + q2 + r2 + s2 = 1/2.
S 1 A B
A p1 q1
B r1 s1
S 2 A B
A p2 q2
B r2 s2
A decision rule is belief-invariant if and only if, for each player, the conditional probability of
choosing A given S 1 is the same as that given S 2; that is, p1+q1 = p2+q2 and p1+r1 = p2+r2. Thus,
in the case of a belief-invariant decision rule, we can rewrite the table using x = p1 + q1 = p2 + q2
and y = p1 + r1 = p2 + r2 as follows.
S 1 A B
A p1 x − p1
B y − p1 1/2 + p1 − x − y
S 2 A B
A p2 x − p2
B y − p2 1/2 + p2 − x − y
Then, the expected value of the potential function (i.e., the identical payoff function) is
Pr[A, A, S 1]+Pr[B, B, S 1] + Pr[A, B, S 2] + Pr[B, A, S 2]
= p1 + (1/2 + p1 − x − y) + (x − p2) + (y − p2)
= 2(p1 − p2) + 1/2,
which takes the maximum value if and only if p1 = 1/4 and p2 = 0. In this case, we must have
x = y = 1/4 because x−p1 = x−1/4 ≥ 0, y−p1 = y−1/4 ≥ 0, and 1/2+p2−x−y = 1/2−x−y ≥ 0.
Therefore, the potential maximizing BIBCE is given by the following table, which is exactly the
same as the BIBCE discussed in the introduction, and it constitutes a unique minimal robust set of
BIBCE by Corollary 2 together with the infection argument in the introduction.
S 1 A B
A 1/4 0
B 0 1/4
S 2 A B
A 0 1/4
B 1/4 0
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
This subsection is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. In the proof, for any countable set S ,
we regard the set of probability distributions ∆(S ) as a subset of a linear space { f : S → R |∑
s∈S | f (s)| < ∞} endowed with the l1-norm ‖ f ‖1 = ∑s∈S | f (s)|. Because S is countable, it is
straightforward to show that the topology of weak convergence in ∆(S ) coincides with the topology
induced by the l1-norm in ∆(S ). Thus, the following result holds by Prohorov’s theorem,7 which
will be used several times in the proof.
Lemma 6. Let ∆(S ) be endowed with the topology induced by the l1-norm. If P ⊂ ∆(S ) is tight,
i.e., for any ε > 0, there exists a finite set Kε ⊂ S such that p(Kε) > 1 − ε for all p ∈ P, then the
closure of P is compact. Conversely, if the closure of P ⊂ ∆(S ) is compact, then P is tight.
The following lemma, which is a weaker version of Theorem 1, is the key to prove Theorem 1.
Lemma 7. Let (T,Θ, pi, u) be an incomplete information game with a generalized potential function
F : A×Θ→ R. Then, every sequence of εk-elaborations {(T,Θ, pik, u)}∞k=1 satisfying limk→∞ εk = 0
and sharing a common elaboration mapping τ has a sequence of BIBCE {σk}∞k=1 such that
lim
k→∞
inf
σ∈EF
∑
(a,t,θ)∈A×T×Θ
∣∣∣σk ◦ pik(a, τ−1(t), θ) − σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)∣∣∣ = 0. (20)
In Lemma 7, an incomplete information game (T,Θ, pi, u) and its ε-elaborations {(T,Θ, pik, u)}∞k=1
have the same sets of types and states and the same payoff functions, where it is implicitly assumed
that T ∗ ⊆ τ(T ) ⊊ T and Θ∗ ⊊ Θ. Note that the domain of F is essentially A × Θ∗ by Definition
4, and F(X, θ) for θ < Θ∗ does not matter at all. Note also that (T,Θ, pik, u) is an εk-elaboration of
(T,Θ, pi, u) if and only if it is an εk-elaboration of (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗).
We can establish Theorem 1 using Lemma 7.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let {(T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k)}∞k=1 be a sequence of εk-elaborations of (T,Θ, pi, u) with
limk→∞ εk = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that T¯ k ∩ T = ∅, T¯ k ∩ T¯ l = ∅, and Θ¯k ∩ Θ¯l = Θ∗
for all k , l. Define T¯ = T ∪
(⋃∞
k=1 T¯
k
)
and Θ¯ =
⋃∞
k=1 Θ¯
k, which are countable.
We construct an equivalent sequence of εk-elaborations {(T¯ , Θ¯, λ¯k, u¯)}∞k=1. Let λ¯k ∈ ∆(T¯ × Θ¯)
be an extension of p¯ik to T¯ : λ¯k(t¯, θ¯) = p¯ik(t¯, θ¯) if (t¯, θ¯) ∈ T¯ k × Θ¯k and λ¯k(t¯, θ¯) = 0 otherwise. Let
7See Billingsley (1999).
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u¯i : A × Θ¯ → R be such that u¯i(·, θ) = ui(·, θ) if θ ∈ Θ∗ and u¯i(·, θ¯) = u¯ki (·, θ¯) if θ¯ ∈ Θ¯k \ Θ∗ for each
i ∈ I. Given an elaboration mapping τk of (T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k), an elaboration mapping τ of (T¯ , Θ¯, λ¯k, u¯)
is defined as τi(t¯i) = τki (t¯i) if t¯i ∈ T¯ ki for each i ∈ I. Clearly, (T¯ , Θ¯, λ¯k, u¯) and (T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k) have the
same minimum representation (every player of every type on the common support has the same
belief and the same payoffs in both games), and (T¯ , Θ¯, λ¯k, u¯) is also an εk-elaboration of (T,Θ, pi, u).
We introduce another incomplete information game (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯), where p¯i ∈ ∆(T¯ × Θ¯) is an
extension of pi to T¯ × Θ¯, i.e., p¯i(t, θ) = pi(t, θ) if (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ and p¯i(t, θ) = 0 otherwise. Note
that (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) and (T,Θ, pi, u) have the same minimum representation, and (T¯ , Θ¯, λ¯k, u¯) is an εk-
elaboration of (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯). Because an arbitrary extension of F toA× Θ¯ is a generalized potential
function of (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯), σ¯ : T¯ × Θ¯ → ∆(A) is a GP-maximizing BIBCE of (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) if and only
if the restriction of σ¯ to T × Θ is a GP-maximizing BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u).
Now let EF be the set of all GP-maximizing BIBCE of (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯). Then, by Lemma 7,
{(T¯ , Θ¯, λ¯k, u¯)}∞k=1 has a sequence of BIBCE {σ¯k}∞k=1 such that
lim
k→∞
inf
σ¯∈EF
∑
(a,t,θ)∈A×T¯×Θ¯
∣∣∣σ¯k ◦ λ¯k(a, τ−1(t), θ) − σ¯ ◦ p¯i(a, t, θ)∣∣∣ = 0,
which is equivalent to
lim
k→∞
inf
σ¯∈EF
sup
E⊆A×T¯×Θ¯
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑(a,t,θ)∈E σ¯k ◦ λ¯k(a, τ−1(t), θ) −
∑
(a,t,θ)∈E
σ¯ ◦ p¯i(a, t, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0.
Let ξ¯k : T¯ k × Θ¯k → ∆(A) be the restriction of σ¯k : T¯ × Θ¯→ ∆(A) to T¯ k × Θ¯k. Then, ξ¯k is a BIBCE
of (T¯ k, Θ¯k, p¯ik, u¯k), and {ξ¯k}∞k=1 satisfies
lim
k→∞
inf
σ∈EF
sup
E⊆A×T×Θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑(a,t,θ)∈E ξ¯k ◦ p¯ik(a, (τk)−1(t), θ) −
∑
(a,t,θ)∈E
σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
because {σ¯ ◦ p¯i ∈ ∆(A × T¯ × Θ¯) | σ¯ ∈ EF} coincides with {σ ◦ pi ∈ ∆(A × T × Θ) | σ ∈ EF} on their
common support. Therefore, EF is a robust set. □
The full proof of Lemma 7 is relegated to Appendix A. In the remainder of this subsection, we
give its sketch for the special case when (T,Θ, pi, u) has a potential function v : A × Θ → R. That
is, we explain how we can prove Corollary 2.
The proof consists of two steps. In the first step, we construct a candidate for {σk}∞k=1 satisfying
(20). For an εk-elaboration (T,Θ, pik, u), let T ki ≡ {ti ∈ Ti | pik(Θ∗i ×Θ−i|ti) = 1} be the set of player i’s
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types who believe that their payoff functions are the same as those in (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗) (the minimum
representation of (T,Θ, pi, u)). Note that pik(T k) ≥ 1 − εk by Definition 2. For each t ∈ T , we write
S k(t) ≡ {i ∈ I | ti ∈ T ki }, which is the set of players whose types are in T ki when a type profile t ∈ T
is realized. We use the following notation.
• For each σ ∈ ΣBI , we write σS (aS |t, θ) ≡ σ({aS } × A−S |t, θ). In particular, when S = {i}, we
write σi(ai|ti) ≡ σ{i}(ai|t, θ) because σ is belief-invariant. Let
Σk ≡ {σ ∈ ΣBI | σ(a|t, θ) = σS k(t)(aS k(t)|t, θ)
∏
i<S k(t)
σi(ai|ti)}
denote the collection of belief-invariant decision rules in which types not in T ki choose inde-
pendent actions. Note that Σk is convex with respect to the following convex combination:
for σ,σ′ ∈ Σk, σ′′ = λσ + (1 − λ)σ′ ∈ Σk is given by
σ′′S k(t)(·|t, θ) = λσS k(t)(·|t, θ) + (1 − λ)σ′S k(t)(·|t, θ),∏
i<S k(t)
σ′′i (·|ti) =
∏
i<S k(t)
(
λσi(·|ti) + (1 − λ)σ′i(·|ti)
)
.
• For each σ ∈ Σk, let
Σk[σ] = {σ′ ∈ Σk | σ′i(ai|ti) = σi(ai|ti) for all ai ∈ Ai, ti < T ki , and i ∈ I}.
This is the collection of decision rules in Σk under which player i ∈ I of type ti < T ki chooses
an action according to the same probability distribution as that under σ. Note that Σk[σ] is a
convex subset of Σk.
• Fix θ∗ ∈ Θ∗. For each θ ∈ Θ, let φ(θ) = (φi(θ))i∈I ∈ Θ∗ = ∏i∈I Θ∗i be such that φi(θ) = θi if
θi ∈ Θ∗i and φi(θ) = θ∗i if θi < Θ∗i . For σ ∈ Σk, let
Σk,F[σ] ≡ arg max
σ′∈Σk[σ]
∑
a,t,θ
σ′(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ))
= arg max
σ′∈Σk[σ]
∑
a,t,θ
σ′ ◦ pik(a, t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)),
which is nonempty because {σ′ ◦ pik ∈ ∆(A × T × Θ) | σ′ ∈ Σk[σ]} is tight and closed, and
thus it is compact by Lemma 6.
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Then, we can show that (T,Θ, pik, u) has is a BIBCE σk ∈ Σk with σk ∈ Σk,F[σk] by observing
that σk is a fixed point of a correspondence Ψ : Σk ⇒ Σk given by the following condition:
σ′ ∈ Ψ(σ) if and only if
σ′(a|t, θ) = σ2S k(t)(aS k(t)|t, θ)
∏
i<S k(t)
σ1i (ai|ti)
for all (a, t, θ), where
• σ1 ∈ Σk and, for each i and ti < T ki , σ1i (ai|ti) > 0 implies
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σN\{i}(a−i|t, θ)pik(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ),
• σ2 ∈ Σk,F[σ] and, for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ T ki , σ2 is obedient for player i of type ti.
Under σ′ ∈ Ψ(σ), each ti < T ki follows σ1 ∈ Σk and chooses a best response to σ, whereas each
ti ∈ T ki follows σ2 ∈ Σk,F(σ) and simultaneously chooses a best response to each other under the
assumption that each ti < T ki adopts the same mixed action as that given by σ. Thus, if σ
k ∈ Ψ(σk),
then σk ∈ Σk,F[σk] and it is obedient; that is, σk ∈ Σk,F[σk] is a BIBCE. It can be readily shown
that Ψ is nonempty-valued, convex-valued, and has a closed graph. Therefore, Ψ has a fixed point
by the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
In the second step, we show that {σk}∞k=1 satisfies (20). To this end, let ηk ∈ ∆(A × T × Θ)
be given by ηk(a, t, θ) ≡ σk ◦ pik(a, τ−1(t), θ) = ∑t′∈τ−1(t) σk(a|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ). Note that ηk(t, θ) ≡∑
a∈A ηk(a, t, θ) = pik(τ−1(t), θ). We write ηk(a|t, θ) ≡ ηk(a, t, θ)/ηk(t, θ) for (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ with
ηk(t, θ) > 0. It can be readily shown that {ηk}∞k=1 is tight, so it has a convergent subsequence by
Lemma 6, which is denoted by {ηkl}∞l=1 with liml→∞ ηkl = η∗. Note that, for each (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ ×
Θ∗, η∗(t, θ) = liml→∞ ηkl(t, θ) = liml→∞ pikl(τ−1(t), θ) = pi(t, θ) by Definition 2. Thus, we have
η∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ) = η∗(a, t, θ). Then, (20) is written as
lim
k→∞
inf
σ∈EF
∑
a,t,θ
∣∣∣ηk(a, t, θ) − σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)∣∣∣ = lim
k→∞
inf
σ∈Σv
∑
a,t,θ
∣∣∣ηk(a, t, θ) − σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)∣∣∣ = 0. (21)
To prove (21), it is enough to show that, for every convergent subsequence {ηkl}∞l=1, there exists
σ ∈ Σv such that η∗(a, t, θ) = σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ); that is, η∗(·|t, θ) ∈ Σv (with some abuse of notation).
Recall that Σv = argmaxσ∈ΣBI
∑
a,t,θ σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a|t, θ).
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We now denote a convergent subsequence by {ηk}∞k=1 with η∗ = limk→∞ ηk rather than {ηkl}∞l=1 to
simplify notation. We can prove η∗(·|t, θ) ∈ Σv by showing that∑
a,t,θ
η∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) ≥
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) (22)
for arbitrary σˆ ∈ Σv, and that η∗(·|t, θ) is belief-invariant and obedient in (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗). Here we
give a proof for (22) (see Appendix A for belief-invariance and obedience). Fix σˆ ∈ Σv and let
σˆk ∈ Σk[σk] be such that
σˆkS k(t)(aS k(t)|t, θ) = σˆS k(t)(aS k(t)|τ(t), θ)
for all (t, θ), which is well-defined because σˆ is belief-invariant. Note that σˆk(a|t, θ) = σˆ(a|τ(t), θ)
if t ∈ T k. Then, σk ∈ Σk,F[σk] implies that∑
a,t,θ
σk(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) ≥
∑
a,t,θ
σˆk(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)). (23)
We first evaluate the limit of the left-hand side of (23) as k → ∞. Because∑
a,t,θ
σk(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) =
∑
a,t,θ
∑
t′∈τ−1(t)
σk(a|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) =
∑
a,t,θ
ηk(a, t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)),
we have
lim
k→∞
∑
a,t,θ
σk(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) =
∑
a,t,θ
η∗(a, t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) =
∑
a,t,θ
η∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ). (24)
We next evaluate the limit of the right-hand side of (23) as k → ∞. Note that∑
a,t,θ
σˆk(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) ≥
∑
a,θ
∑
t∈T k
σˆ(a|τ(t), θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) + pik(T \ T k) inf
a,θ
v(a, θ),
and the first term in the right-hand side is evaluated as∑
a,θ
∑
t∈T k
σˆ(a|τ(t), θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) =
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)pik(τ−1(t) ∩ T k, θ)v(a, φ(θ))
≥
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ)v(a, φ(θ)) − pik(T \ T k) sup
a,θ
v(a, θ)
=
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)ηk(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) − pik(T \ T k) sup
a,θ
v(a, θ).
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Thus, we have
lim
k→∞
∑
a,t,θ
σˆk(a|t, θ)pik(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ))
≥ lim
k→∞
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)ηk(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) + pik(T \ T k)(inf
a,θ
v(X, θ) − sup
a,θ
v(a, θ))
=
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)η∗(t, θ)v(a, φ(θ)) =
∑
a,t,θ
σˆ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ). (25)
Combining (23), (24), and (25), we obtain (22).
5 Robust BIBCE of supermodular games
This section focuses on supermodular games and studies their robust BIBCE.
5.1 Supermodular potential games
Recall that a robust BIBCE of the example in the introduction is not a BNE. This is why we have
to adopt BIBCE as a solution concept rather than BNE. Then, a natural question arises: in what
class of incomplete information games can a BNE be robust? This subsection demonstrates that
a robust set of BIBCE given by Theorem 1 contains BNE if the game is a supermodular potential
game.
Let Ai be linearly ordered with ≥i. We write ≥P for the product order: a ≥P b if ai ≥i bi for all
i ∈ I. We say that (T,Θ, pi, u) is a supermodular incomplete information game if, for each θ ∈ Θ,
the ex-post game with a payoff function profile (ui(·, θ))i∈I satisfies strategic complementarities;
that is, for each i ∈ I and a, b ∈ A with a ≥P b,
ui(ai, a−i) − ui(bi, a−i) ≥ ui(ai, b−i) − ui(bi, b−i).
Proposition 3. Assume that a supermodular incomplete information game (T,Θ, pi, u) has a po-
tential function v : A × Θ→ R. Then, the following holds.
• For a potential maximizing BIBCE σ ∈ Σv, let σ = (σi)i∈I and σ = (σi)i∈I be strategy profiles
such that, for each ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I, σi(ai|ti) = 1 if ai = max{ai |σi(ai|ti) > 0} andσi(ai|ti) = 1
if ai = min{ai |σi(ai|ti) > 0}, respectively, where σi(ai|ti) = σ({ai}×A−i|t, θ). Then, σ,σ ∈ Σv.
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• Let σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈I and σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈I be strategy profiles such that, for each ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I,
σ∗i (ai|ti) = 1 if ai = max{ai |σi(ai|ti) > 0, σ ∈ Σv} and σ∗i (ai|ti) = 1 if ai = min{ai |σi(ai|ti) >
0, σ ∈ Σv}, respectively. Then, σ∗, σ∗ ∈ Σv.
• If a potential maximizing BIBCE is unique, then it is a potential maximizing BNE. Con-
versely, if a potential maximizing BNE is unique, then it is a potential maximizing BIBCE.
Proof. See Appendix B. □
By Proposition 3, for each potential maximizing BIBCE, the strategy profile that is the supre-
mum (or infimum) of the BIBCE is a potential maximizing BIBCE. Moreover, the strategy profile
that is the supremum (or infimum) of the set of potential maximizing BIBCE is also a poten-
tial maximizing BIBCE. This implies that the robust set of potential maximizing BIBCE contains
BNE, and in particular, if the set is a singleton, then the unique potential maximizing BIBCE must
be a BNE.
As an application of Proposition 3, we consider an incomplete information game with two
players 1 and 2 and two actions 0 and 1. The set of states isΘ = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .}. We assume that state
k ∈ Θ occurs with probability ε(1− ε)k > 0, where ε ∈ (0, 1). Player 1 has an information partition
{{0}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}, . . .}, and player 2 has an information partition Π2 = {{0, 1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . .}. The
type of a player with a partition {k − 1, k} (or {k}) is referred to as type k. Thus, the sets of player
1’s types and player 2’s types are T1 = {0, 2, 4, . . .} and T2 = {1, 3, 5, . . .}, respectively. Note that
the prior pi ∈ ∆(T × Θ) is given by
pi(t, θ) =

ε(1 − ε)k if t1 = k, t2 = k + 1, and θ = k is even,
ε(1 − ε)k if t1 = k + 1, t2 = k, and θ = k is odd,
0 otherwise,
which implies that
pi(t2, θ|t1) =

1 if t1 = 0, t2 = 1, and θ = 0,
(1 − ε)/(2 − ε) if t1 = k, t2 = k + 1, and θ = k , 0 is even,
1/(2 − ε) if t1 = k + 1, t2 = k, and θ = k is odd,
0 otherwise,
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pi(t1, θ|t2) =

(1 − ε)/(2 − ε) if t1 = k + 1, t2 = k, and θ = k is odd,
1/(2 − ε) if t1 = k, t2 = k + 1, and θ = k , 0 is even,
0 otherwise.
We assume the following payoff table for each state k ∈ Θ, where δ ∈ (0, 1).
1 0
1 δk, δk δk − 1, 0
0 0, δk − 1 0, 0
This game is a supermodular potential game with the following potential function.
1 0
1 δk 0
0 0 1 − δk
A pure-strategy profile is represented by a sequence of actions x = (xk)∞k=0 ∈ {0, 1}T1∪T2 , where
xk ∈ {0, 1} is an action of player 1 with type k if k is even and an action of player 2 with type k if k
is odd. We denote by X the set of all such sequences. Let zn ∈ X be the decreasing sequence such
that znk = 1 if k ≤ n − 1 and znk = 0 if k ≥ n. Then, the minimum BNE is represented by z0, and the
maximum BNE is represented by z∞. Note that zn with n ≥ 1 (i.e., type 0 chooses 1) is a BNE if
and only if n ≥ n, where n is the minimum integer satisfying δn ≤ (1 − ε)/(2 − ε), which can be
verified by the standard argument of iterated elimination of dominated actions.
We characterize a potential maximizing BNE. Note that the expected value of the potential
function under x ∈ X is
f (x) =
∞∑
k=0
ε(1 − ε)k
(
δkxkxk+1 + (1 − δk)(1 − xk)(1 − xk+1)
)
.
Note that
f (zn) =

∑∞
k=n ε(1 − ε)k(1 − δk) if n ≤ 1,∑n−2
k=0 ε(1 − ε)kδk +
∑∞
k=n ε(1 − ε)k(1 − δk) if n ≥ 2.
Thus, for n ≥ 1,
f (zn+1) − f (zn) = ε(1 − ε)n−1δn−1 − ε(1 − ε)n(1 − δn) = ε(1 − ε)n−1(δn−1(1 + (1 − ε)δ) − (1 − ε)),
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and
f (zn+1) ⪌ f (zn) ⇔ δn−1 ⪌ (1 − ϵ)/(1 + (1 − ε)δ) ⇔ n ⪋ k∗,
where k∗ ∈ R is the unique solution to
δk
∗
= (1 − ϵ)δ/(1 + (1 − ε)δ). (26)
Therefore, f (zn) ≥ f (zn′) for all n′ if n = n∗ ≡ dk∗e.
Suppose that k∗ is not an integer. We show that the strategy profile represented by zn
∗
is a robust
BIBCE. By Corollary 2 and Proposition 3, it is enough to establish f (zn
∗
) > f (x) for all x , zn
∗
.
Consider the following two types of non-optimal strategy profiles.
• Let x ∈ X be such that x0 = 0. Then, for x′ ∈ X given by x′0 = x′1 = 1 and x′k = xk for all
k ≥ 2,
f (x′) − f (x) ≥ ε − ε(1 − ε)(1 − δ) > 0.
• Let x ∈ X be such that x0 = 1 and n ≡ min{k | xk = 0} ≤ n∗ − 1. Then, for x′ ∈ X given by
x′n = 1 and x
′
k = xk for all k , n,
f (x′)− f (x) ≥ ε(1−ε)n−1δn−1−ε(1−ε)n(1−δn) = ε(1−ε)n−1(δn−1(1+ (1−ε)δ)− (1−ε)) > 0
because n ≤ n∗ − 1 < k∗.
The above discussion implies that if x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈X f (x), then x∗k ≥ zn
∗
k for all k. We then
consider the following type of non-optimal strategy profiles.
• Let x ∈ X be such that there exists n ≥ n∗ satisfying xn = 1 and xn+1 = 0. Then, for x′ ∈ X
given by x′n = 0 and x
′
k = xk for all k , n,
f (x′)− f (x) ≥ ε(1− ε)n(1− δn)− ε(1− ε)n−1δn−1 = ε(1− ε)n−1(1− ε− δn−1(1+ (1− ε)δ) > 0
because n ≥ n∗ > k∗.
The above discussion implies that if x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈X f (x), then x∗ = zn∗ or x∗ = z∞, but we know
that f (zn
∗
) > f (z∞). Therefore, x∗ = zn
∗
.
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5.2 Binary-action supermodular games with monotone potential functions
Let (T,Θ, pi, u) be a binary-action incomplete information game with Ai = {0, 1}, where we write
ai ≥ bi and a ≥ b rather than ai ≥i bi and a ≥P b, respectively, for the sake of notational simplicity.
For S ⊆ I, we denote by 1S the action profile such that all players in S play action 1, and the others
play action 0. We write 1 = 1I by convention. We provide a sufficient condition for robust BIBCE
of binary-action games, in particular, binary-action supermodular games.
Suppose that there exists a function v : A × Θ → R and a constant λi > 0 for each i ∈ I such
that
λi(ui((1, a−i), θ) − ui((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ) (27)
for all a−i ∈ A−i and θ ∈ Θ. This function v is referred to as a monotone potential function (Morris
and Ui, 2005). If λi = 1 for all i ∈ I and the equality holds in (27), then a monotone potential
function is a potential function. We say that a monotone potential function v is supermodular if,
for each i ∈ I and a, b ∈ A with a ≥ b, it holds that v(ai, a−i) − v(bi, a−i) ≥ v(ai, b−i) − v(bi, b−i).
The next lemma shows that a monotone potential function is a special case of a generalized po-
tential function if the game or the monotone potential function is supermodular, which generalizes
the corresponding result in the case of complete information games (Morris and Ui, 2005).
Lemma 8. Let Ai = {{0, 1} , {1}}, and define a one-to-one mapping Λi : Ai → Ai by Λi(1) = {1}
and Λi(0) = {0, 1} for each i ∈ I. Let v : A × Θ → R be a monotone potential function of
(T,Θ, pi, u). If (T,Θ, pi, u) or v is supermodular, then F : A × Θ→ R given by F(Λ(a), θ) = v(a, θ)
is a generalized potential function, where Λ(a) =
∏
i∈I Λi(ai) = {a′ ∈ A | a′ ≥ a}.
Proof. Let Pi ∈ ∆(A−i × A−i × Θ) satisfy Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) = 0 whenever a−i < X−i. Recall that we
write Pi(a−i, θ) =
∑
X−i Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) and Pi(X−i, θ) =
∑
a−i Pi(a−i, X−i, θ). Then, for each increasing
subset B−i ⊆ A−i (i.e. a−i ∈ B and a′−i ≥ a−i imply a′−i ∈ B−i),∑
a−i∈B−i
Pi(a−i, θ) =
∑
a−i∈B−i
∑
X−i⊆A−i
Pi(a−i, X−i, θ),
∑
a−i∈B−i
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ) =
∑
X−i⊆B−i
∑
a−i∈B−i
Pi(a−i, X−i, θ).
Thus, ∑
a−i∈B−i
Pi(a−i, θ) ≥
∑
a−i∈B−i
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ).
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That is, Pi(a−i|θ) ∈ ∆(A−i) first-order stochastically dominates Pi(Λ−i(a−i)|θ) ∈ ∆(A−i). This implies
that, if the game is supermodular, then∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)(ui((1, a−i), θ)−ui((0, a−i), θ)) ≥
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ)(ui((1, a−i), θ)−ui((0, a−i), θ)), (28)
and if the monotone potential function is supermodular, then∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)(v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ)) ≥
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ)(v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ)). (29)
Using either (28) or (29), we show that F is a generalized potential function.
If
{0, 1} ∈ arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
X−i,θ
Pi(X−i, θ)F((X′i , X−i), θ),
then it is obvious that
{0, 1} ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) , ∅.
If
{1} ∈ arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
X−i,θ
Pi(X−i, θ)F((X′i , X−i), θ),
then ∑
a−i,θ
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ)(v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ) ≥ 0. (30)
Thus, if the game is supermodular, then∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)(ui((1, a−i), θ) − ui((0, a−i), θ)) ≥
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ)(ui((1, a−i), θ) − ui((0, a−i), θ))
≥ λ−1i
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ)(v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ 0
by (27), (28), and (30), and if the monotone potential function is supermodular, then∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)(ui((1, a−i), θ) − ui((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ λ−1i
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)(v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ))
≥ λ−1i
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(Λ−i(a−i), θ)(v((1, a−i), θ) − v((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ 0
by (27), (29), and (30). Each case implies that
1 ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,θ
Pi(a−i, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ).
Therefore, F is a generalized potential function. □
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Let
Σv ≡ arg max
σ∈ΣBI
∑
a,t,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ)
denote the set of all belief-invariant decision rules that maximize the expected value of a monotone
potential function v. Using Σv, we provide a sufficient conditions for BIBCE in the next proposi-
tion.
Proposition 4. Let (T,Θ, pi, u) be a binary-action incomplete information game with a monotone
potential function v : T × Θ → R. Assume that the game or the monotone potential function is
supermodular. Then,
Ev ≡ {σ ∈ ΣBI | σ is a BIBCE such that, for each (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ, σ(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A) first-order
stochastically dominates σ′(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A) for some σ′ ∈ Σv}
is a robust set of BIBCE. In particular, if Σv = {σ∗} with σ∗(1|t, θ) = 1 for all (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ, then
σ∗ is a robust BIBCE. If the monotone potential function is supermodular, then Ev is reduced to
Ev = {σ ∈ ΣBI | σ is a BIBCE such that, for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti,
σi(1|ti) = 1 if σ′i(1|ti) = 1 for all σ′ ∈ Σv}.
To prove Proposition 4, we use the following lemma, which holds not only for monotone
potential functions of binary-action supermodular games but also for arbitrary generalized potential
functions of arbitrary incomplete information games.
Lemma 9. For anyA-consistent decision-communication rule γ, it holds that∑
a∈B
γ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
X⊆B,X∈A
γ(X|t, θ) (31)
for all B ∈ 2A and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ. Conversely, for any σ : T × Θ → ∆(A) and ρ : T × Θ → ∆(A)
such that ∑
a∈B
σ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
X⊆B,X∈A
ρ(X|t, θ) (32)
for all B ∈ 2A and (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ, there exists anA-consistent decision-communication rule γ such
that γ(a|t, θ) = σ(a|t, θ) and γ(X|t, θ) = ρ(X|t, θ) for all a ∈ A, X ∈ A, and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ.
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Proof. The first part holds because∑
a∈B
γ(a|t, θ) =
∑
a∈B
∑
X∈A
γ(a, X|t, θ) ≥
∑
a∈B
∑
X⊆B,X∈A
γ(a, X|t, θ) =
∑
X⊆B,X∈A
γ(X|t, θ).
To prove the second part, fix (t, θ) and we write σ(a) and ρ(X) instead of σ(a|t, θ) and ρ(X|t, θ),
respectively, ignoring (t, θ) to simplify notation. Let ν : 2A → [0, 1] be such that
ν(B) =
∑
X⊆B,X∈A
ρ(X)
for each B ∈ 2A. Then, ν can be interpreted as a totally monotone transferable utility game (with
a fictitious set of players A), where the dividend of a coalition X ∈ 2A is ρ(X) if X ∈ A and zero
otherwise. Moreover, (32) is rewritten as∑
a∈B
σ(a) ≥ ν(B),
which implies that σ is in the core of ν. It is well known that σ is in the core if and only if, for
each X ∈ 2A with a positive dividend (i.e. X ∈ A), there exists µX ∈ ∆(X) such that
σ(a) =
∑
X∈A
µX(a)ρ(X).
Because the above discussion is valid for each fixed (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ, there exists µX(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(X)
for each X ∈ A and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ such that
σ(a|t, θ) =
∑
X∈A
µX(a|t, θ)ρ(X|t, θ).
Then, a decision-communication rule γ given by γ(a, X|t, θ) = µX(a|t, θ)ρ(X|t, θ) satisfies the con-
dition in the second part of the proposition. □
We are ready to prove Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is enough to show that Ev is the set of all GP-maximizing BIBCE, where
the generalized potential function F is given by Lemma 8. Note that
Ev = {σ ∈ ΣBI | σ is a BIBCE such that, for each increasing subset B ⊆ A and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ,∑
a∈B
σ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
a∈B
σ′(a|t, θ) for some σ′ ∈ Σv}.
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Let Γv be the set of belief-invariant decision-communication rules that maximize the expected
value of F:
Γv ≡ argmax
γ∈ΓBI
∑
X,t,θ
γ(X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F(X, θ) = argmax
γ∈ΓBI
∑
a,t,θ
γ(Λ(a)|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ), (33)
where the last equality holds by Lemma 8.
Suppose that σ ∈ ΣBI is a GP-maximizing BIBCE. Then, there exists a BIBCE-C γ ∈ Γv such
that σ(a|t, θ) = γ(a|t, θ) for all (a, t, θ) ∈ A×T ×Θ. Let σ′ ∈ ΣBI be such that σ′(a|t, θ) = γ(Λ(a)|t, θ)
for all (a, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ. Then, σ′ ∈ Σv by (33), and∑
a∈B
σ(a|t, θ) =
∑
a∈B
γ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
X⊆B
γ(X|t, θ) =
∑
a∈B
γ(Λ(a)|t, θ) =
∑
a∈B
σ′(a|t, θ) (34)
for all increasing subset B ⊆ A by (31). Therefore, σ ∈ Ev holds.
Suppose that σ ∈ Ev. Then, there exists σ′ ∈ Σv satisfying (34) for all increasing subset B ⊆ A.
Let ρ : T × Θ → ∆(A) be such that ρ(Λ(a)|t, θ) = σ′(a|t, θ) for all (a, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ. Then, for
each increasing subset B ⊆ A,∑
a∈B
σ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
a∈B
σ′(a|t, θ) =
∑
a∈B
ρ(Λ(a)|t, θ) =
∑
X⊆B
ρ(X|t, θ). (35)
In addition, (35) holds for all B ⊆ A because B′ ≡ ⋃X⊂B,X∈A X ⊆ B is an increasing subset and∑
a∈B
σ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
a∈B′
σ(a|t, θ) ≥
∑
X⊆B′
ρ(X|t, θ) =
∑
X⊆B
ρ(X|t, θ). (36)
Thus, by Lemma 9, there exists anA-consistent decision-communication rule γ such that γ(a|t, θ) =
σ(a|t, θ) and γ(X|t, θ) = ρ(X|t, θ) for all a ∈A, X ∈ A, and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ. Note that γ ∈ Γv because
σ′ ∈ Σv, and that γ is a BIBCE-C because σ is a BIBCE. Therefore, σ ∈ Ev is a GP-maximizing
BIBCE.
By the above discussion, we conclude that Ev coincides with the set of all GP-maximizing
BIBCE, which is a robust set of BIBCE by Theorem 1.
Finally, assume that v is supermodular. Let σ◦ ∈ Σv be such that, for each ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I,
σ◦i (0|ti) = σ◦({0} × A−i|t, θ) > 0 if σ′i(0|ti) > 0 for some σ′ ∈ Σv. Note that σ0 exists because
Σv is a convex set and we can construct σ◦ in terms of a convex combination of elements in
{σ′ ∈ Σv | σ′i(0|ti) > 0 for some ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I}. Then, the strategy profile σ◦ = (σ◦i )i∈I given
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by σ◦i (min{ai |σ◦i (ai|ti) > 0}|ti) = 1 for each ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I is an element of Σv by Proposi-
tion 3. Moreover, it can be readily shown that, for each σ ∈ Σv and (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ, σ(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A)
first-order stochastically dominates σ◦(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A). Thus,
Ev = {σ ∈ ΣBI | σ is a BIBCE such that, for each (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ, σ(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A) first-order
stochastically dominates σ◦(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A)},
which establishes the last claim of the proposition. □
5.3 The generalized critical path theorem
Using the result in the previous subsection on binary-action supermodular games, we generalize
the critical path theorem of Kajii and Morris (1997) and Oyama and Takahashi (2020), which
evaluates the probability of a common belief event. Kajii and Morris (1997) consider a common
p-belief event, where p = (pi)i∈I is a vector of constant probabilities. On the other hand, Oyama
and Takahashi (2020) adopt a generalized belief operator (Morris and Shin, 2007; Morris et al.,
2016) and consider a common f-belief event, where f = ( fi)i∈I is a vector of real-valued functions
defined on the set of all coalitions consisting of the opponents. In contrast, we allow each fi to
depend upon a state as well; that is, we introduce a more general notion of a common belief event.
Let (T,Θ, pi, u) be a binary-action supermodular incomplete information game with a monotone
potential function v : A × Θ → R such that Σv = {σ∗} with σ∗(1|t, θ) = 1 for all (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ.
Note that σ∗ is a robust BIBCE by Proposition 4. As demonstrated below, this result implies the
generalized critical path theorem.
We write I = 2I , I−i = 2I\{i}, Ti = 2Ti , T = {E = ∏i∈I Ei | Ei ∈ Ti} ⊂ 2T , and T−i = {E−i =∏
j,i E j | E j ∈ T j} ⊂ 2T−i . Each E = ∏i∈I Ei ∈ T is associated with the strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I
given by σi(1|ti) = 1 if ti ∈ Ei and σi(0|ti) = 1 if ti < Ei.
For each i ∈ I, we define the “payoff increment” function fi : I−i × Θ→ R by
fi(S , θ) = ui(1S∪{i}, θ) − ui(1S , θ)
for (S , θ) ∈ I−i×Θ. That is, fi(S , θ) is the payoff increment for player i by switching his action from
0 to 1 when the set of the opponents playing action 1 is S and the state is θ. Because (T,Θ, pi, u) is
a supermodular incomplete information game, fi(S , θ) ≤ fi(S ′, θ) whenever S ⊆ S ′.
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We introduce fi-belief. When Θ is a singleton, it is the same as fi-belief introduced by Morris
and Shin (2007) and Morris et al. (2016).
For i ∈ I and E−i = ∏ j,i E j ∈ T−i, define the function S E−i : T−i → I−i by
S E−i(t−i) = { j , i | t j ∈ E j}.
The conditional expected value of fi(S E−i(t−i), θ) given ti,
E[ fi(S E−i(t−i), θ)|ti] =
∑
t−i,θ
pi(t−i, θ|ti) fi(S E−i(t−i), θ),
is the expected payoff increment for player i of type ti when each j , i chooses action 1 if t j ∈ E j
and action 0 if t j < E j.
Definition 5. For i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and E = ∏ j E j ∈ T , type ti is said to have fi-belief about E if
ti ∈ Ei and E[ fi(S E−i(t−i), θ)|ti] ≥ 0. Player i’s fi-belief operator B fii : T → Ti is defined by
B fii (E) = {ti ∈ Ei | E[ fi(S E−i(t−i), θ)|ti] ≥ 0}
for each E =
∏
j E j ∈ T ; that is, B fii (E) is the set of player i’s types that have fi-belief about E.
For example, let
fi(S , θ) =

1 − pi(θ) if S = I \ {i},
−pi(θ) otherwise
for (S , θ) ∈ I−i × Θ, where pi(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for each θ ∈ Θ. Then,
E[ fi(S E−i(t−i), θ)|ti] =
∑
t−i∈E−i,θ∈Θ
pi(t−i, θ|ti)(1− pi(θ))−
∑
t−i<E−i,θ∈Θ
pi(t−i, θ|ti)pi(θ) = pi(E−i|ti)−E[pi(θ)|ti].
Thus,
B fii (E) = {ti ∈ Ei | pi(E−i|ti) ≥ E[pi(θ)|ti]}.
If pi(θ) = pi is a constant independent of θ, then B
fi
i is reduced to player i’s pi-belief operator.
If F =
∏
j F j ∈ T satisfies Fi ⊂ B fii (F) for each i ∈ I, we say that F is f-evident, where
f = ( fi)i∈I . For an f-evident event F, let σ = (σi)i∈I be the associated strategy profile; that is,
σi(1|ti) = 1 if ti ∈ Fi and σi(0|ti) = 1 if ti < Fi for each i ∈ I. Then, it is clear that, for each ti ∈ Fi
and i ∈ I, action 1 is a best response to σ−i.
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A typical f-evident event is given by a common f-belief operator, which is defined as follows.
For a payoff increment function profile f = ( fi)i∈I and E =
∏
i Ei ∈ T , let
Bf,0i (E) = Ei,
Bf,n+1i (E) = B
fi
i
∏
j
Bf,nj (E)
 for n ≥ 0,
CBfi (E) =
∞⋂
n=0
Bf,ni (E).
We say that ti ∈ Ti has common f-belief about E ∈ T if ti ∈ CBfi (E). We write CBf(E) =∏
jCBfj(E) and call CB
f : T → T a common f-belief operator. The following result is a straight-
forward generalization of the corresponding result for common p-belief and common f-belief when
Θ is a singleton.
Proposition 5. For each E ∈ T , CBf(E) is the largest f-evident event contained in E.
We are ready to state the generalized critical path theorem, which is implied by the robustness
of GP-maximizing BIBCE in Proposition 4.
Proposition 6. Let (T,Θ, pi, u) be a binary-action supermodular game with a monotone potential
function v : A × Θ→ R and a payoff increment function profile f = ( fi)i∈I . Assume that
Σv = {σ∗}, (37)
where σ∗(1|t, θ) = 1 for all (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ. Then, for any δ > 0, there exists ε > 0 such that, for
every E =
∏
i Ei ∈ T with pi(E) ≥ 1 − ε, it holds that
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ 1 − δ. (38)
Proof. See Appendix C. □
In the following special case, we can obtain ε in a closed-form expression.
Proposition 7. Let (T,Θ, pi, u) be a binary-action supermodular game with a monotone potential
function v : A×Θ→ R and a payoff increment function profile f = ( fi)i∈I . For each E = ∏i Ei ∈ T ,
let
M(v, pi, E) ≡ inf
t∈E∩T ∗,S,I
∑
θ
pi(θ|t)(v(1, θ) − v(1S , θ)),
38
M∗(v, pi) ≡ M(v, pi, T ∗) = inf
t∈T ∗,S,I
∑
θ
pi(θ|t)(v(1, θ) − v(1S , θ)),
M∗∗(v) ≡ inf
S,I,θ∈Θ
v(1, θ) − v(1S , θ).
Then, the following holds.
1. If M∗(v, pi) > 0, then (37) holds. Moreover, for any δ > 0 and E =
∏
i Ei ∈ T with
pi(E) ≥ 1 − δ/κ∗(v, pi), (38) holds, where
κ∗(v, pi) ≡ 1 + supS⊆S ′,I,θ∈Θ v(1S , θ) − v(1S ′ , θ)
M∗(v, pi)
> 0.
That is,
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ 1 − κ∗(v, pi)(1 − pi(E)). (39)
In particular, if M∗∗(v) > 0, then
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ 1 − κ∗∗(v)(1 − pi(E)), (40)
where
κ∗∗(v) ≡ 1 + supS⊆S ′,I,θ∈Θ v(1S , θ) − v(1S ′ , θ)
M∗∗(v)
> 0.
2. For any E ∈ T with M(v, pi, E) > 0,
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ 1 − κ(v, pi, E)(1 − pi(E)), (41)
where
κ(v, pi, E) ≡ 1 + supS⊆S ′,I,θ∈Θ v(1S , θ) − v(1S ′ , θ)
M(v, pi, E)
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix C. □
The second part of Proposition 7, which is the critical path theorem for an event E satisfying
M(v, pi, E) > 0, is valid even if (37) does not hold. The first part of Proposition 7 is reduced to the
critical path theorem of Oyama and Takahashi (2020) when Θ is a singleton, and it is reduced to
the critical path theorem of Kajii and Morris (1997) when fi-belief is pi-belief.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 7
We give the proof of Lemma 7. Let T ki ≡ {ti ∈ Ti | pik(Θ∗i × Θ−i|ti) = 1} and S k(t) ≡ {i ∈ I | ti ∈ T ki },
which are the same as those in the sketch of the proof in Section 4.3. We also use the following
notation.
• For each γ ∈ ΓBI , we write γS (as, XS |t, θ) ≡ γ({aS }×A−S ×{XS }×A−S |t, θ) for the conditional
distribution of (aS , XS ) ∈ AS ×AS given (t, θ) ∈ T ×Θ. In particular, when S = {i}, we simply
write γi(ai, Xi|ti) ≡ γ{i}(ai, Xi|t, θ) because γ is belief-invariant. We also write γS (aS |t, θ) =
γS ({aS } × AS |t, θ) and γS (XS |t, θ) = γS (AS × {XS }|t, θ) for the marginal distributions. Let
Γk ≡ {γ ∈ ΓBI | γ(a, X|t, θ) = γS k(t)(aS k(t), XS k(t)|t, θ)
∏
i<S k(t)
γi(ai, Xi|ti)}
denote the collection of belief-invariant decision-communication rules in which types not in
T ki receive independent signals and choose independent actions. Note that Γ
k is convex with
respect to the following convex combination: for γ, γ′ ∈ Γk, γ′′ = λγ+ (1−λ)γ′ ∈ Γk is given
by
γ′′S k(t)(·|t, θ) = λγS k(t)(·|t, θ) + (1 − λ)γ′S k(t)(·|t, θ),∏
i<S k(t)
γ′′i (·|ti) =
∏
i<S k(t)
(
λγi(·|ti) + (1 − λ)γ′i (·|ti)
)
.
• For each γ ∈ Γk, let
Γk[γ] = {γ′ ∈ Γk | γ′i (ai|ti) = γi(ai|ti) for all ai ∈ Ai, ti < T ki , and i ∈ I}.
This is the collection of decision-communication rules in Γk under which player i ∈ I of type
ti < T ki chooses an action according to the same probability distribution as that under γ. Note
that Γk[γ] is a convex subset of Γk.
• Fix θ∗ ∈ Θ∗. For each θ ∈ Θ, let φ(θ) = (φi(θ))i∈I ∈ Θ∗ = ∏i∈I Θ∗i be such that φi(θ) = θi if
θi ∈ Θ∗i and φi(θ) = θ∗i if θi < Θ∗i .
In the next lemma, we construct a candidate for {σk}∞k=1 satisfying (20).
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Lemma A. An εk-elaboration (T,Θ, pik, u) has is a BIBCE-C γk ∈ Γk satisfying
γk ∈ arg max
γ∈Γk[γk]
∑
(X,t,θ)∈A×T×Θ
γ(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)). (A1)
Thus, there exists a BIBCE σk ∈ ΣBI given by σk(a|t, θ) = γk(a|t, θ).
Proof. We first characterize γk as a fixed point of a correspondence on Γk, which is composed of
two correspondences. Then, we establish the existence of a fixed point. The proof consists of the
following four steps.
Step 1: We define the first correspondence Ψ1 : Γk ⇒ Γk:
Ψ1(γ) = {γ′ ∈ Γk | for each ti < T ki , γ′i (ai|ti) > 0 implies
ai ∈ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i,t−i,θ
γN\{i}(a−i|t, θ)pik(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ),
γ′(a, X|t, θ) = γ(aS k(t), XS k(t)|t, θ)
∏
i<S k(t)
γ′i (ai, Xi|ti) for all (a, t, θ)}.
Under γ′ ∈ Ψ1(γ), each type ti < T ki chooses a best response to γ, whereas each type ti ∈ T ki follows
γ. Note that Ψ1(γ) is a nonempty convex subset of Γk.
Step 2: To define the second correspondence, we use the following collection of decision-communication
rules: for γ ∈ Γk,
Γk,F[γ] ≡ arg max
γ′∈Γk[γ]
∑
X,t,θ
γ′(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ))
= arg max
γ′∈Γk[γ]
∑
X,t,θ
γ′ ◦ pik(X, t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)),
which is nonempty because {γ′ ◦ pik ∈ ∆(A ×A × T ×Θ) | γ′ ∈ Γk[γ]} is tight and closed, and thus
it is compact by Lemma 6. Note that (A1) is written as γk ∈ Γk,F[γk]. The second correspondence
Ψ2 : Γk ⇒ Γk is given by
Ψ2(γ) = {γ′ ∈ Γk,F[γ] | for each i ∈ I and (ti, Xi) ∈ T ki ×Ai, γ′ is obedient for i with (ti, Xi)}.
Under γ′ ∈ Ψ2(γ), each type ti < T ki adopts the same mixed action as that given by γ, whereas each
type ti ∈ T ki simultaneously chooses a best response to each other; that is, given the mixed actions
of types not in T ki , types in T
k
i behave as if they follow a BIBCE-C.
41
Note that Ψ2(γ) is a convex subset of Γk. We show that Ψ2(γ) is nonempty. Fix γ0 ∈ Γk,F[γ]
and let Γ0 = {γ′ ∈ Γk,F[γ] | γ′(X|t, θ) = γ0(X|t, θ) for all (X, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ}. Fix i ∈ I, ti ∈ T ki ,
and Xi ∈ Ai with ∑X−i,t−i,θ γ0(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ) > 0. Then, for arbitrary γ′ ∈ Γ0, it holds that
Xi ∈ arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
X−i,t−i,θ
γ0(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F((X′i , X−i), φ(θ))
= arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
X−i,t−i,θ
γ′(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F((X′i , X−i), φ(θ)) (A2)
because ti ∈ T ki and γ0 ∈ Γk,F[γ]. Define Pi ∈ ∆(A−i ×A−i × Θ∗) by
Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) =
∑
ai∈Ai, t−i∈T−i, θ′∈φ−1(θ)
γ′(a, X|t, θ′)pik(t, θ′)/Z,
where Z =
∑
a,X−i,t−i,θ′∈φ−1(θ) γ
′(a, X|t, θ′)pik(t, θ′). Note that Pi(a−i, X−i, θ) = 0 if a−i < X−i. Then,
∑
X−i,t−i,θ
γ′(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F((X′i , X−i), φ(θ)) =
∑
X−i,t−i,θ
 ∑
θ′∈φ−1(θ)
γ′(X|t, θ′)pik(t, θ′)
 F((X′i , X−i), θ)
= Z
∑
(X−i,θ)∈A−i×Θ∗
Pi(X−i, θ)F((X′i , X−i), θ), (A3)
where Pi(X−i, θ) =
∑
a−i∈A−i Pi(a−i, X−i, θ), and thus (A2) is rewritten as
Xi ∈ arg max
X′i∈Ai
∑
(X−i,θ)∈A−i×Θ∗
Pi(X−i, θ)F((X′i , X−i), θ),
which implies that
Xi ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
(a−i,θ)∈A−i×Θ∗
Pi(a−i, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) , ∅ (A4)
by Definition 4, where Pi(a−i, θ) =
∑
X−i∈A−i Pi(a−i, X−i, θ). Because ti ∈ T ki and ui(a, θ) = ui(a, θ′)
whenever θi = θ′i ∈ Θ∗i , if pik(t, θ) > 0, then θi ∈ Θ∗i and ui(a, θ) = ui(a, φ(θ)). This implies that
Z
∑
(a−i,θ)∈A−i×Θ∗
Pi(a−i, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ)
=
∑
(a−i,θ)∈A−i×Θ∗
 ∑
ai∈Ai, X−i∈A−i, t−i∈T−i, θ′∈φ−1(θ)
γ′(a, X|t, θ′)pik(t, θ′)
 ui((a′i , a−i), θ)
=
∑
(a−i,θ)∈A−i×Θ∗
 ∑
ai∈Ai, X−i∈A−i, t−i∈T−i, θ′∈φ−1(θ)
γ′(a, X|t, θ′)pik(t, θ′)ui((a′i , a−i), θ′)

=
∑
a∈A, X−i∈A−i t−i∈T−i, θ∈Θ
γ′(a, X|t, θ)pik(t, θ′)ui((a′i , a−i), θ).
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Thus, by (A4),
Xi ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a, X−i, t−i, θ
γ′(a, X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) , ∅. (A5)
To summarize, we have shown that if ti ∈ T ki and Xi ∈ Ai with
∑
X−i,t−i,θ γ
0(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ) > 0, then
(A5) holds for arbitrary γ′ ∈ Γ0.
Now let ρ : T × Θ → ∆(A) be a communication rule with ρ(X|t, θ) = γ0(X|t, θ). Consider the
conjunction of (T,Θ, pi, u) and ρ and let ΣAi [γ
0] be the set of player i’s strategies in the conjunction
that always assign some ai ∈ Xi whenever player i receives a signal Xi ∈ Ai and player i of type
ti < T ki follows γ
0:
ΣAi [γ
0] = {σi : Ti ×Ai → ∆(Ai) |σi(ai|ti, Xi) = 0 whenever ai < Xi,
σi(ai|ti, Xi)γ0i (Xi|ti) = γ0i (ai, Xi|ti) for all ti < T ki }.
Note that any decision-communication rule induced by ρ and σ ∈ ΣA[γ0] (which is given by
γ(a, X|t, θ) = ∏i σi(ai|ti, Xi)ρ(X|t, θ)) is an element of Γ0. Thus, the correspondence Φ : ΣA[γ0] ⇒
ΣA[γ0] given by
Φ(σ) = {σ′ ∈ ΣA[γ0] | for each i ∈ I and (ti, Xi) ∈ T ki ×Ai, (σ′i , σ−i) is obedient for (ti, Xi)}
is nonempty-valued by (A5) because, for any σ ∈ ΣA[γ0], i ∈ I, ti ∈ T ki , and Xi ∈ Ai with∑
X−i,t−i,θ ρ(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ) > 0, it holds that
Xi ∩ argmax
a′i∈Ai
∑
a−i, X−i, t−i, θ
∏
j,i
σ j(a j|t j, X j)
 ρ(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ) , ∅.
Moreover, it is readily shown that Φ is convex-valued and has a closed graph. Therefore, Φ has a
fixed point σ∗ ∈ ΣA[γ0] by the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem. Then, the decision-
communication rule induced by σ∗ and ρ is obedient for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ T ki , so it is an element
of Ψ2(γ).
Step 3: In this step, we construct another correspondence Ψ using Ψ1 and Ψ2 and show that its
fixed point is a BIBCE-C satisfying (A1). Let a correspondence Ψ : Γk ⇒ Γk be given by
Ψ(γ) = {γ′ ∈ Γk | γ′(a, X|t, θ) = γ2S k(t)(aS k(t), XS k(t)|t, θ)
∏
i<S k(t)
γ1i (ai, Xi|ti) for all (a, X, t, θ),
where γ1 ∈ Ψ1(γ) and γ2 ∈ Ψ2(γ)}.
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If γ is a fixed point, i.e., γ ∈ Ψ(γ), then γ ∈ Ψ1(γ) and γ ∈ Ψ2(γ). Thus, γ satisfies (A1) by
γ ∈ Ψ2(γ). Moreover, γ is obedient for player i of type ti < T ki because γ ∈ Ψ1(γ), and it is obedient
for player i of type ti ∈ T ki because γ ∈ Ψ2(γ); that is, γ is a BIBCE-C. Thus, to prove Lemma A,
it is enough to show that Ψ has a fixed point.
Step 4: We show that Ψ has a fixed point. Consider
Γk ◦ pik ≡ {γ ◦ pik ∈ ∆(A ×A × T × Θ) | γ ◦ pik(a, X, t, θ) = γ(a, X|t, θ)pik(t, θ), γ ∈ Γk}
and identify Γk with Γk ◦ pik, i.e., we regard Γk as the set of equivalence classes induced by each
γ ◦ pik ∈ Γk ◦ pik, where γ and γ′ are equivalent if γ ◦ pik = γ′ ◦ pik. Note that Γk ◦ pik is a tight closed
subset of ∆(A × A × T × Θ). Thus, by Lemma 6, it is a compact convex subset of a topological
vector space. This implies that we can regard Ψ as a correspondence defined on such a set, which
possesses the following properties.
• Ψ(γ) is nonempty because Ψ1(γ) and Ψ2(γ) are nonempty.
• Ψ(γ) is convex because Ψ1(γ) and Ψ2(γ) are convex.
• Because expected payoffs are continuous with respect to decision-communication rules,
Ψ1(γ) and Ψ2(γ) are easily shown to be closed subsets of a compact set Γk. Thus, Ψ(γ)
is compact.
• We can establish the closed graph property of Ψ because each of Ψ1 and Ψ2 has a closed
graph.
– Because Ψ1 is a best response correspondence for types not in T k, we can readily show
that Ψ1 has a closed graph by the maximum theorem.
– We show that Ψ2 has a closed graph. Let {γl}∞l=1, {ξl}∞l=1 ⊂ Γk be convergent sequences
such that ξl ∈ Ψ2(γl) for each l, liml→∞ γl = γ∗, and liml→∞ ξl = ξ∗. Note that γ∗, ξ∗ ∈ Γk
since Γk is compact. Because expected payoffs are continuous with respect to decision-
communication rules and the correspondence γ 7→ Γk[γ] is continuous, we have ξ∗ ∈
Γk,F[γ∗] by the maximum theorem. Moreover, because ξl is obedient for payer i of type
ti ∈ T ki for each l, ξ∗ must be also obedient for player i of type ti ∈ T ki . Therefore, we
can conclude that ξ∗ ∈ Ψ2(γ∗), which implies that Ψ2 has a closed graph.
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Then, by the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem and the above argument, Ψ has a fixed
point. □
We now prove Lemma 7 using Lemma A.
Proof of Lemma 7. Let γk andσk be the BIBCE-C and the BIBCE of (T,Θ, pik, u) given in LemmaA,
respectively. Let ηk ∈ ∆(A × A × T × Θ) be given by ηk(a, X, t, θ) ≡ γk ◦ pik(a, X, τ−1(t), θ) =∑
t′∈τ−1(t) γk(a, X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ). Note that ηk(t, θ) ≡ ∑(a,X)∈A×A ηk(a, X, t, θ) = pik(τ−1(t), θ). We write
ηk(a, X|t, θ) ≡ ηk(a, X, t, θ)/ηk(t, θ), ηk(a|t, θ) ≡
∑
X∈A
ηk(a, X|t, θ), ηk(X|t, θ) ≡
∑
a∈A
ηk(a, X|t, θ)
for (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ with ηk(t, θ) > 0. It can be readily shown that {ηk}∞k=1 is tight, so it has a
convergent subsequence by Lemma 6, which is denoted by {ηkl}∞l=1 with liml→∞ ηkl = η∗. Note that,
for each (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ × Θ∗, η∗(t, θ) = liml→∞ ηkl(t, θ) = liml→∞ pikl(τ−1(t), θ) = pi(t, θ). Thus, we have
η∗(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ) = η∗(a, X, t, θ).
To establish Lemma 7, it is enough to show that {σk}∞k=1 satisfies (20), which is written as
lim
k→∞
inf
σ∈EF
∑
(a,t,θ)∈A×T×Θ
∣∣∣ηk(a, t, θ) − σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)∣∣∣ = 0, (A6)
where ηk(a, t, θ) =
∑
X∈A ηk(a, X, t, θ). To prove (A6), it is enough to show that, for every convergent
subsequence {ηkl}∞l=1, there exists σ ∈ EF such that η∗(a, t, θ) = σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ) . In fact, if (A6) does
not hold, then there exists a convergent subsequence {ηkl}l=1 such that
lim
l→∞
inf
σ∈EF
∑
(a,t,θ)∈A×T×Θ
∣∣∣ηkl(a, t, θ) − σ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)∣∣∣
= inf
σ∈EF
∑
(a,t,θ)∈A×T×Θ
|η∗(a, t, θ) − σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)| > 0,
which implies that there is no σ ∈ EF with η∗(a, t, θ) = σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ). In the remainder of the
proof, we denote a convergent subsequence by {ηk}∞k=1 with limk→∞ ηk = η∗ rather than {ηkl}∞l=1.
First, we show that η∗(·|t, θ) is belief-invariant as a decision-communication rule of (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗).
Fix i ∈ I and (t, θ) ∈ T ∗ ×Θ∗, and we focus on sufficiently large k satisfying εk < pik(τ−1i (ti)) (recall
that limk→∞ pik(τ−1i (ti))) = pi(t) > 0). Define
ζki (ai, Xi|ti) ≡
∑
t′i∈τ−1i (ti)
γki (ai, Xi|t′i )pik(t′i )/pik(τ−1i (ti)),
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where γki (ai, Xi|t′i ) ≡
∑
a−i,X−i γ
k(a, X|t′, θ), which is well-defined because γk is belief-invariant. Re-
call that
ηk(a, X|t, θ) =
∑
t′∈τ−1(t)
γk(a, X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)/pik(τ−1(t), θ),
and thus
ηk(ai, Xi|t, θ) =
∑
t′i∈τ−1i (ti)
γki (ai, Xi|t′i )pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)/pik(τ−1(t), θ).
To establish the belief-invariance of η∗(·|t, θ), it is enough to show that
lim
k→∞
|ηk(ai, Xi|t, θ) − ζki (ai, Xi|ti)|
= lim
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
t′i∈τ−1i (ti)
γki (ai, Xi|t′i )
(
pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
− pi
k(t′i )
pik(τ−1i (ti))
)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0 (A7)
because this implies that
|η∗(ai, Xi|t, θ) − η∗(ai, Xi|(ti, t′−i), θ′)|
= lim
k→∞
|ηk(ai, Xi|t, θ) − ηk(ai, Xi|(ti, t′−i), θ′)|
≤ lim
k→∞
|ηk(ai, Xi|t, θ) − ζki (ai, Xi|ti)| + limk→∞ |η
k(ai, Xi|(ti, t′−i), θ′) − ζki (ai, Xi|ti)| = 0.
To show (A7), observe that∣∣∣∣∣∣pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ) − pik(t′i )pik(τ−1i (ti))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ) − pik(t′i )pi(ti) pi(t, θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣pik(t′i )pi(ti) pi(t, θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ) − pi
k(t′i )
pi(ti)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣∣∣∣pik(t′i )pi(ti) − pi
k(t′i )
pik(τ−1i (ti))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Using the definition of an ε-elaboration, we can evaluate each term in the right-hand side as fol-
lows: there exists T ♭,ki ⊂ Ti with pik(T ♭,ki ) ≥ 1 − εk such that, for all t′i ∈ τ−1i (t) ∩ T ♭,ki (which is
nonempty because pik(τ−1i (ti)) > ε
k),∣∣∣∣∣∣pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ) − pik(t′i )pi(ti) pi(t, θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = pik(t′i )pik(τ−1(t), θ) ∣∣∣pik(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|t′i ) − pi(t−i, θ|ti)∣∣∣
≤ pi
k(t′i )
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
εk,
∣∣∣∣∣∣pik(t′i )pi(ti) pi(t, θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ) − pi
k(t′i )
pi(ti)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = pik(t′i )pi(ti)pik(τ−1(t), θ) ∣∣∣pi(t, θ) − pik(τ−1(t), θ)∣∣∣ ≤ pi
k(t′i )
pi(ti)pik(τ−1(t), θ)
εk,
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∣∣∣∣∣∣pik(t′i )pi(ti) − pi
k(t′i )
pik(τ−1i (ti))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = pik(t′i )pi(ti)pik(τ−1i (ti))
∣∣∣pik(τ−1i (ti)) − pi(ti)∣∣∣ ≤ pik(t′i )
pi(ti)pik(τ−1i (ti))
εk.
Thus, ∣∣∣∣∣∣pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ) − pik(t′i )pik(τ−1i (ti))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ εkpik(t′i )
(
1
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
+
1
pi(ti)pik(τ−1(t), θ)
+
1
pi(ti)pik(τ−1i (ti))
)
.
Then,
|ηk(ai, Xi|t, θ) − ζki (ai, Xi|ti)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
t′i∈τ−1i (ti)∩T ♭,ki
γki (ai, Xi|t′i )
(
pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
− pi
k(t′i )
pik(τ−1i (ti))
)
+
∑
t′i∈τ−1i (ti)\T ♭,ki
γki (ai, Xi|t′i )
(
pik({t′i } × τ−1−i (t−i), θ)
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
− pi
k(t′i )
pik(τ−1i (ti))
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ εkpik(τ−1i (ti) ∩ T ♭,ki )
(
1
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
+
1
pi(ti)pik(τ−1(t), θ)
+
1
pi(ti)pik(τ−1i (ti))
)
+ pik(τ−1i (ti) \ T ♭,ki )
≤ εk
(
1
pik(τ−1(t), θ)
+
1
pi(ti)pik(τ−1(t), θ)
+
1
pi(ti)pik(τ−1i (ti))
+ 1
)
→ 0
as k → ∞, which implies (A7).
Next, we show that η∗(·|t, θ) is obedient as a decision-communication rule of (T ∗,Θ∗, pi∗, u∗).
Because a decision-communication rule γk is obedient in (T,Θ, pik, u), it holds that∑
a−i, X−i, t−i, θ
γk(a, X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i, X−i, t−i, θ
γk(a, X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ)
for all ti ∈ Ti, Xi ∈ Ai, ai ∈ Xi, a′i ∈ Ai, and i ∈ I. This is written as
∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
 ∑
t′−i∈τ−1−i (t−i)
γk(a, X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)
 ui(a, θ) ≥ ∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
 ∑
t′−i∈τ−1−i (t−i)
γk(a, X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)
 ui((a′i , a−i), θ),
where we replace ti with t′i . Then, by summing each side of the above inequality over t
′
i ∈ τ−1i (ti)
for ti ∈ T ∗i , we obtain
∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
 ∑
t′∈τ−1(t)
γk(a, X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)
 ui(a, θ) ≥ ∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
 ∑
t′∈τ−1(t)
γk(a, X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)
 ui((a′i , a−i), θ),
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which is written as ∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
ηk(a, X, t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
ηk(a, X, t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ).
In the limit as k goes to infinity, we have∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
η∗(a, X, t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
η∗(a, X, t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ).
Because η∗(t, θ) = pi(t, θ), the above is reduced to∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
η∗(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui(a, θ) ≥
∑
a−i,X−i,t−i,θ
η∗(a, X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)ui((a′i , a−i), θ).
Therefore, η∗(·|t, θ) is obedient.
Finally, we show that η∗(·|t, θ) is an element of ΓF; that is,∑
X,t,θ
η∗(X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F(X, θ) ≥
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F(X, θ) (A8)
for arbitrary γˆ ∈ ΓF . Fix γˆ ∈ ΓF and let γˆk ∈ Γk[γk] be such that
γˆkS k(t)(aS k(t), XS k(t)|t, θ) = γˆS k(t)(aS k(t), XS k(t)|τ(t), θ),
which is well-defined because γˆ is belief-invariant. Note that γˆk(a, X|t, θ) = γˆ(a, X|τ(t), θ) if t ∈ T k.
Then, γk ∈ Γk,F[γk] implies that∑
X,t,θ
γk(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) ≥
∑
X,t,θ
γˆk(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)). (A9)
We first evaluate the limit of the left-hand side of (A9) as k → ∞. Because∑
X,t,θ
γk(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) =
∑
X,t,θ
∑
t′∈τ−1(t)
γk(X|t′, θ)pik(t′, θ)F(X, φ(θ))
=
∑
X,t,θ
ηk(X, t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)),
we have
lim
k→∞
∑
X,t,θ
γk(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) =
∑
X,t,θ
η∗(X, t, θ)F(X, φ(θ))
=
∑
X,t,θ
η∗(X, t|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F(X, θ). (A10)
48
We next evaluate the limit of the right-hand side of (A9) as k → ∞. Note that∑
X,t,θ
γˆk(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) ≥
∑
X,θ
∑
t∈T k
γˆ(X|τ(t), θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) + pik(T \ T k) inf
X,θ
F(X, θ),
and the first term in the right-hand side is reduced to∑
X,θ
∑
t∈T k
γˆ(X|τ(t), θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) =
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)pik(τ−1(t) ∩ T k, θ)F(X, φ(θ))
≥
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)pik(τ−1(t), θ)F(X, φ(θ)) − pik(T \ T k) sup
X,θ
F(X, θ)
=
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)ηk(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) − pik(T \ T k) sup
X,θ
F(X, θ).
Thus, we have
lim
k→∞
∑
X,t,θ
γˆk(X|t, θ)pik(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ))
≥ lim
k→∞
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)ηk(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ)) + pik(T \ T k)(inf
X,θ
F(X, θ) − sup
X,θ
F(X, θ))
=
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)η∗(t, θ)F(X, φ(θ))
=
∑
X,t,θ
γˆ(X|t, θ)pi(t, θ)F(X, θ). (A11)
Combining (A9), (A10), and (A11), we obtain (A8).
Because a decision-communication rule η∗(a, X|t, θ) is an element of ΓF and it is a BIBCE-C, a
decision rule η∗(a|t, θ) is an element of EF , which completes the proof. □
B Proof of Proposition 3
We give the proof of Proposition 3. A function f : A → R is a supermodular function if, for any
a, b ∈ A,
f (a ∨ b) + f (a ∧ b) ≥ f (a) + f (b),
where a∨ b = (max{ai, bi})i∈I is the join of a and b, and a∧ b = (min{ai, bi})i∈I is the meet of a and
b. We use the following lemmas.
Lemma B. Let v : A × Θ → R be a potential function of a supermodular incomplete information
game. Then, v(·, θ) : A → R is a supermodular function for each θ ∈ Θ.
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Proof. It is well known that, if a function f : A → R satisfies increasing differences, i.e., f (ai, a−i)−
f (bi, a−i) ≥ f (ai, b−i) − f (bi, b−i) for each i ∈ I and a, b ∈ A with a ≥P b, and Ai is a lattice for each
i ∈ I, then f is a supermodular function. Strategic complementarities and increasing differences
are equivalent, and a linearly ordered finite set Ai is a lattice. □
Lemma C. Let f : A → R be a supermodular function. For arbitrary µ ∈ ∆(A), there exists
µ∗ ∈ ∆(A) satisfying the following conditions.
• The marginal probability distributions of µ and µ∗ on Ai are the same for each i ∈ I.
• ∑a µ∗(a) f (a) ≥ ∑a µ(a) f (a).
• The support of µ∗ denoted by supp(µ∗) is linearly ordered with respect to ≥P; that is, for any
a, b ∈ supp(µ∗), either a ≥P b or b ≥P a.
Proof. We use the following notation.
• Let ≥L denote the lexicographic order on A; that is, a >L b if there exists i ∈ I such that
ai > bi and a j = b j for all j < i.
• For A′ = {a1, . . . , aK} ⊆ A, which is lexicographically ordered with a1 >L a2 >L · · · >L aK ,
let κ1(A′) ∈ {1, . . . ,K} be the smallest number such that there exists k ≥ κ1(A′) + 1 satisfying
aκ1(A
′) ≱P ak. Let κ2(A′) ≥ κ1(A′)+ 1 be the smallest number satisfying aκ1(A′) ≱P aκ2(A′). Note
that, for each k < κ1(A′) and l > k, ak >P al as well as ak >L al. We write α(A′) = aκ1(A
′) and
β(A′) = aκ2(A
′).
• For each µ ∈ ∆(A) and a, b ∈ A, let φ[µ|a, b] ∈ ∆(A) be such that
φ[µ|a, b](x) =

µ(x) −minx′∈{a,b} µ(x′) if x ∈ {a, b},
µ(x) +minx′∈{a,b} µ(x′) if x ∈ {a ∨ b, a ∧ b},
µ(x) if x < {a, b, a ∨ b, a ∧ b}.
Then,∑
x
φ[µ|a, b](x) f (x)−
∑
x
φ[µ|a, b](x) f (x) = min
x′∈{a,b}
µ(x′)( f (a∨b)+ f (a∧b)− f (a)− f (b)) ≥ 0
because f is a supermodular function. The marginal probability distributions of φ[µ|a, b] and
µ on Ai are the same for each i ∈ I because {ai, bi} = {(a ∨ b)i, (a ∧ b)i}.
50
Fix µ ∈ ∆(A). Let µ0 = µ and A0 = supp(µ0). For each n ≥ 1, if κ1(An−1) exists, define
µn ∈ ∆(A) and An = supp(µn) recursively by the rule
µn = φ[µn−1|α(An−1), β(An−1)].
If κ1(An−1) does not exist, set µ∗ = µn−1. Then, supp(µ∗) is linearly ordered with respect to ≥P,
and µ and µ∗ have the same marginal distributions because, for each k, µk and µk+1 have the same
marginal distributions. Moreover,
∑
x µ
∗(a) f (a) ≥ ∑x µ(a) f (a).
We show that the above procedure terminates in finite steps, which implies that µ∗ exists. To
this end, it is enough to show that κ1(An) ≥ κ1(An−1) and κ2(An) ≥ κ2(An−1), and that at least one of
the inequalities is strict. In fact, if this is true, then, for sufficiently large n, κ1(An) does not exist
because κ1(An) ≤ #|A| − 1 and κ2(An) ≤ #|A|, so we can obtain µ∗ in finite steps.
Observe that
An = (An−1 ∪ {α(An−1) ∨ β(An−1), α(An−1) ∧ β(An−1)}) \ arg min
x∈{a,b}
f (x).
Thus, the rank of α(An−1) ∨ β(An−1) in An is κ1(An−1), and that of α(An−1) ∧ β(An−1) is greater than
or equal to κ2(An−1). By construction, we must have α(An−1) ∨ β(An−1) ≥L α(An) and α(An−1) ∧
β(An−1) ≥L β(An); that is, κ1(An) ≥ κ1(An−1) and κ2(An) ≥ κ2(An−1). Now suppose that κ1(An) =
κ1(An−1), i.e., α(An) = α(An−1)∨β(An−1). Because α(An−1)∨β(An−1) >P α(An−1)∧β(An−1), it follows
that α(An−1)∧β(An−1) >L β(An), which implies that κ2(An) > κ2(An−1). Consequently, we have either
κ1(An) = κ1(An−1) and κ2(An) > κ2(An−1), or κ1(An) > κ1(An−1) and κ2(An) ≥ κ2(An−1). □
We are ready to prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first prove the first claim. By Lemma B, v(·, θ) : A → R is a super-
modular function. Thus, by Lemma C, there exists σ∗ ∈ ΣBI such that, for each (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ,
σ∗(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A) satisfies the following conditions.
• The marginal probability distributions of σ(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A) and σ∗(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A) on Ai are the
same for each i ∈ I. That is, σ∗({ai} × A−i|t, θ) = σ({ai} × A−i|t, θ) = σi(ai|ti) is independent
of t−i and θ.
• ∑a σ∗(a|t, θ)v(a, θ) ≥ ∑a σ(a|t, θ)v(a, θ).
51
• The support of σ∗(·|t, θ) is linearly ordered with respect to ≥P.
By the second condition, it holds that∑
a,t,θ
σ∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) ≥
∑
a,t,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ),
which implies that σ∗ is also a potential maximizing BIBCE.
Given σ∗, we construct a function α : [0, 1] × T × Θ→ A satisfying the following conditions.
• For each (z, t, θ) ∈ [0, 1] × T × Θ, α(z, t, θ) ∈ A is in the support of σ∗(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A), and
α(z, t, θ) is right continuous and increasing in z; that is, limz′→z+ α(z′, t, θ) = α(z, t, θ) and
α(z, t, θ) ≥P α(z′, t, θ) if z ≥ z′.
• For each (a, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ,
σ∗(a|t, θ) =
∫ 1
0
δa(α(z, t, θ))dz,
where δa : A → {0, 1} is given by δa(x) = 1 if x = a and δa(x) = 0 if x , a.
Let αi(z, t, θ) ∈ Ai denote player i’s action in the action profile α(z, t, θ) ∈ A, i.e., α(z, t, θ) =
(αi(z, t, θ))i∈I . Note that ∑
a−i∈A−i
δa(α(z, t, θ)) = δai(αi(z, t, θ)),
where δai : Ai → {0, 1} is given by δai(xi) = 1 if xi = ai and δai(xi) = 0 if xi , ai. Thus,
σ∗i (ai|ti) = σ∗({ai} × A−i|t, θ) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
∫ 1
0
δa(α(z, t, θ))dz =
∫ 1
0
δai(αi(z, t, θ))dz
for each ai ∈ Ai, which implies that αi(z, t, θ) is independent of t−i and θ because αi(z, t, θ) is
increasing in z. This observation allows us to write αi(z, ti) = αi(z, t, θ) and α(z, t) = (αi(z, ti))i∈I =
α(z, t, θ). That is, for each a ∈ A, we can write
σ∗(a|t, θ) =
∫ 1
0
δa(α(z, t))dz.
Now, for each ρ ∈ (0, 1), define decision rules σρ, σρ ∈ Σ by
σρ(a|t, θ) =
∫ 1
0
δa(α(ρz, t))dz,
σρ(a|t, θ) =
∫ 1
0
δa(α(ρ + (1 − ρ)z, t))dz.
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Note that σρ and σρ are belief-invariant because
σρ({ai} × A−i|t, θ) =
∫ 1
0
δai(αi(ρz, ti))dz,
σρ({ai} × A−i|t, θ) =
∫ 1
0
δai(αi(ρ + (1 − ρ)z, ti))dz,
which are independent of t−i and θ. Note also that, for each (a, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ,
σ∗(a|t, θ) = ρσρ(a|t, θ) + (1 − ρ)σρ(a|t, θ).
Thus,∑
a,t,θ
σ∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) = ρ
∑
a,t,θ
σρ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) + (1 − ρ)
∑
a,t,θ
σρ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ),
which implies that∑
a,t,θ
σ∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) =
∑
a,t,θ
σρ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) =
∑
a,t,θ
σρ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ)
because σ∗ is a potential maximizing BIBCE and σρ and σρ are belief-invariant decision rules.
Clearly, σ(a|t) = limρ→0 σρ(a|t, θ) and σ(a|t) = limρ→1 σρ(a|t, θ) for each (a, t, θ) ∈ A × T × Θ.
Moreover, it can be readily shown that limρ→0 σρ = σ and limρ→0 σ
ρ
= σ in the topology of the set
of distributional decision rules discussed in Section 2. Therefore,∑
a,t,θ
σ∗(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) =
∑
a,t,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ) =
∑
a,t,θ
σ(a|t, θ)pi(t, θ)v(a, θ),
and thus σ and σ are potential maximizing BIBCE, which completes the proof of the first claim.
To prove the second claim, note that Σv is convex; that is, any convex combination of potential
maximizing BIBCE is a potential maximizing BIBCE. Thus, there exists σ′ ∈ Σv such that, for
each ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I, σ′i(ai|ti) > 0 and σ′i(ai|ti) > 0 for ai = max{ai |σi(ai|ti) > 0, σ ∈ Σv} and
ai = min{ai |σi(ai|ti) > 0, σ ∈ Σv}. Then, we can obtain the second claim by applying the first
claim to σ′ and σ′.
The last claim is implied by the first claim. □
C Proofs of Propositions 6 and 7
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix δ > 0. Because σ∗ is a robust BIBCE of (T,Θ, pi, u), there exists ε¯ > 0
such that, for all ε ≤ ε¯, every ε-elaboration (T¯ , Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) with an elaboration mapping τ has a BIBCE
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σ¯ such that
sup
D⊆A×T×Θ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑(a,t,θ)∈D σ¯ ◦ p¯i(a, τ−1(t), θ) −
∑
(a,t,θ)∈D
σ∗ ◦ pi(a, t, θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ,
which implies that ∑
(t¯,θ)∈T¯×Θ
σ¯(1|t¯, θ)p¯i(t¯, θ) =
∑
(t,θ)∈T×Θ
σ¯ ◦ p¯i(1, τ−1(t), θ) ≥ 1 − δ. (C1)
Using (C1), we prove the proposition, and to this end, we construct an appropriate ε-elaboration.
Fix ε ≤ ε¯2, where ε¯ is given above. For an arbitrary E = ∏i∈I Ei ∈ T with pi(E) = 1 − ε, we
construct a
√
ε-elaboration (T, Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) as follows.
• An elaboration mapping τ : T → T is the identity mapping, i.e., τ(t) = (τi(ti))i∈I = t for each
t ∈ T .
• Θ¯i = Θi ∪ {0} and Θ¯ = ∏i∈I Θ¯i (recall that Θ = ∏i∈I Θi).
• For each i ∈ I,
u¯i(a, θ) =

ui(a, (θi, θ′−i)) if θi ∈ Θi, where θ′−i ∈ Θ−i (which can be arbitrary),
1 if ai = 0 and θi = 0,
0 if ai = 1 and θi = 0.
That is, action 0 is a dominant action when player i’s payoff type is 0.
• For t ∈ T with J = {i ∈ I | ti < Ei},
p¯i(t, θ) =

pi(t, θ) if J = ∅ and θ ∈ Θ,∑
θ′J∈ΘJ pi(t, (θI\J, θ
′
J) if J , ∅, θi ∈ Θi for i ∈ I \ J, and θi = 0 for i ∈ J,
0 otherwise.
To show that (T, Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) is a
√
ε-elaboration, we check the three conditions in Definition 2
(the definition of an ε-elaboration). Clearly, the first condition is satisfied. To check the second
condition, let T ♯i = Ei for each i ∈ I. Then, p¯i(T ♯) = pi(E) = 1 − ε ≥ 1 −
√
ε. In addition, if ti ∈ T ♯i ,
then p¯i(Θi×Θ¯−i|ti) = 1, and if ti < T ♯i , then p¯i(Θi×Θ¯−i|ti) = 0. Thus, T ♯i = {ti ∈ Ti | p¯i(Θi×Θ¯−i|ti) = 1},
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which implies the second condition. We check the third condition. For each D ⊆ T × Θ,∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t,θ)∈D
p¯i(τ−1(t), θ) −
∑
(t,θ)∈D
pi(t, θ)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t,θ)∈D
(p¯i(t, θ) − pi(t, θ))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t,θ)∈D,t∈T ♯
(p¯i(t, θ) − pi(t, θ)) +
∑
(t,θ)∈D,t<T ♯
(p¯i(t, θ) − pi(t, θ))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t,θ)∈D,t<T ♯
(p¯i(t, θ) − pi(t, θ))
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
(t,θ)∈D,t<T ♯
pi(t, θ) ≤ pi(T \ T ♯) = ε ≤ √ε.
Let T ♭i = {ti ∈ T ♯i | p¯i(T ♯−i|ti) ≥ 1 −
√
ε} = {ti ∈ T ♯i | pi(T ♯−i|ti) ≥ 1 −
√
ε}. Then, for each ti ∈ T ♭i and
D−i ⊆ T−i × Θ,∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i
p¯i(τ−1−i (t−i), θ|ti) −
∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i
pi(t−i, θ|τi(ti))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i
(p¯i(t−i, θ|ti) − pi(t−i, θ|ti))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i,t−i∈T ♯−i
(p¯i(t−i, θ|ti) − pi(t−i, θ|ti)) +
∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i,t−i<T ♯−i
(p¯i(t−i, θ|ti) − pi(t−i, θ|ti))
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ ∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i,t−i<T ♯−i
(p¯i(t−i, θ|ti) − pi(t−i, θ|ti))
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
(t−i,θ)∈D−i,t−i<T ♯−i
pi(t−i, θ|ti) ≤ pi(T−i \ T ♯−i|ti) ≤
√
ε.
Moreover,
1 − ε = pi(T ♯) =
∑
ti∈T ♭i
pi(T ♯−i|ti)pi(ti) +
∑
ti∈T ♯i \T ♭i
pi(T ♯−i|ti)pi(ti) ≤ pi(T ♭i ) + (1 −
√
ε)(1 − pi(T ♭i )),
and thus p¯i(T ♭i ) = pi(T
♭
i ) ≥ 1 −
√
ε. Therefore, the third condition of Definition 2 is satisfied.
Let σ¯ ∈ ΣBI be a BIBCE of the √ε-elaboration (T, Θ¯, p¯i, u¯) satisfying (C1); that is,∑
(t,θ)∈T×Θ
σ¯(1|t, θ)p¯i(t, θ) ≥ 1 − δ.
Let E∗i ⊆ Ei be the set of player i’s types who choose action 1 with a positive probability under σ¯:
E∗i = {ti ∈ Ei | σ¯i(1|ti) > 0}.
Let σ∗ = (σ∗i )i∈I be the strategy profile associated with E
∗ =
∏
i∈I E∗i ; that is, σ
∗
i (1|ti) = 1 if ti ∈ E∗i
and σ∗i (0|ti) = 1 if ti < E∗i . Then, it is straightforward to show that, for each (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ,
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σ∗(·|t) ≡ ∏i σ∗i (·|ti) ∈ ∆(A) first-order stochastically dominates σ¯(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A). In particular, we
have σ∗(1|t) ≥ σ¯(1|t, θ), and thus,
p¯i(E∗) =
∑
(t,θ)∈T×Θ
σ∗(1|t)p¯i(t, θ) ≥
∑
(t,θ)∈T×Θ
σ¯(1|t, θ)p¯i(t, θ) ≥ 1 − δ.
For (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ¯ and i ∈ I with ti ∈ E∗i , let σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ) = σ¯((1, a−i)|t, θ)/σ¯i(1|ti) and
σ∗−i(a−i|t−i) =
∏
j,i σ
∗
j(a j|t j). We show that σ∗−i(·|t−i) ∈ ∆(A−i) first-order stochastically dominates
σ¯−i(·|t, θ) ∈ ∆(A−i). To this end, fix (t, θ) ∈ T × Θ¯ and i ∈ I with ti ∈ E∗i , and let a∗ ∈ A be such
that a∗j = 1 if t j ∈ E∗j and a∗j = 0 if t j < E∗j , which implies that σ∗−i(a∗−i|t−i) = 1. Then, for any
deceasing set B−i ⊆ A−i (i.e., a−i ∈ B−i implies a′−i ∈ B−i for each a′−i ≤ a−i), if a∗−i < B−i, then∑
a−i∈B−i σ
∗
−i(a−i|t−i) = 0 ≤
∑
a−i∈B−i σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ), and if a∗−i ∈ B−i, then
∑
a−i∈B−i σ
∗
−i(a−i|t−i) = 1 =∑
a−i∈B−i σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ), where the last equality holds because, if
1 >
∑
a−i∈B−i
σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ) ≥
∑
a−i≤a∗−i
σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ),
then there exists a′−i ≰ a
∗
−i satisfying σ¯−i(a
′
−i|t, θ) > 0; that is, there exists j ∈ I with 1 > a∗j = 0 and
σ¯ j(1|t j) > 0, which contradicts the choice of a∗j. Therefore, we conclude that σ∗−i(·|t−i) first-order
stochastically dominates σ¯−i(·|t, θ).
By obedience of the BIBCE σ¯ of (T, Θ¯, p¯i, u¯), for each i ∈ I with ti ∈ E∗i , it holds that∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ¯((1, a−i)|t, θ)p¯i(t, θ)(u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ 0,
or equivalently, ∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ)p¯i(t, θ)(u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ 0. (C2)
Because u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ) is increasing in a−i and σ∗−i(·|t−i) first-order stochastically
dominates σ¯−i(·|t, θ), we have∑
a−i
σ∗−i(a−i|t−i)(u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ)) ≥
∑
a−i
σ¯−i(a−i|t, θ)(u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ))
for each t−i and θ with p¯i(t, θ) > 0. Thus, by (C2),∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ∗−i(a−i|t−i)p¯i(t, θ)(u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ 0,
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or equivalently, ∑
a−i,t−i,θ
σ∗−i(a−i|t−i)p¯i(t−i, θ|ti)(u¯i((1, a−i), θ) − u¯i((0, a−i), θ)) ≥ 0. (C3)
For each i ∈ I, let f¯i : I−i × Θ¯→ R be the payoff increment function of u¯i: f¯i(S , θ) = u¯i(1S∪{i}, θ) −
u¯i(1S , θ). Then, noting that σ∗−i(a−i|t−i) = 1 if { j , i | a j = 1} = { j , i | t j ∈ E∗j} and σ∗−i(a−i|t−i) = 0
otherwise, we can rewrite (C3) as∑
t−i,θ
p¯i(t−i, θ|ti) f¯i(S E∗−i(t−i), θ) ≥ 0, (C4)
which holds for each ti ∈ E∗i .
We now consider (T,Θ, pi, u). For each i ∈ I, let fi : I−i × Θ → R be the payoff increment
function of ui. Note that fi(S , θ) = f¯i(S , θ) if θi ∈ Θi. Thus, by (C4) and the construction of p¯i,
E[ fi(S E∗−i(t−i), θ)|ti] =
∑
t−i,θ
pi(t−i, θ|ti) fi(S E∗−i(t−i), θ) ≥ 0
for each ti ∈ E∗i , which implies that
E∗i ⊆ B fii (E∗) = {ti | E[ fi(S E∗−i(t−i), θ)|ti] ≥ 0}.
That is, E∗ is an f-evident event contained in E. Therefore, E∗ ⊆ CBf(E) and pi(CBf(E)) ≥ pi(E∗) =
p¯i(E∗) ≥ 1 − δ, thus establishing the proposition. □
Proof of Proposition 7. This proof generalizes the proofs of Ui (2001), Morris and Ui (2005), and
the alternative proof of the critical path theorem in Oyama and Takahashi (2019) (the working
paper version of Oyama and Takahashi (2020)).
We first prove the second claim of the proposition. Fix E =
∏
i Ei ∈ T satisfying M(v, pi, E) >
0. Let E∗ =
∏
i E∗i ∈ T be such that E∗ ⊆ E and∑
(t,θ)∈T×Θ
pi(t, θ)v(1S E∗ (t), θ) ≥
∑
(t,θ)∈T×Θ
pi(t, θ)v(1S E′ (t), θ) (C5)
for all E′ =
∏
i E′i ∈ T with E′ ⊆ E, where S E′(t) = {i ∈ I | ti ∈ E′i }. Then, for each ti ∈ E∗i , it holds
that
E[ fi(S E∗−i(t−i, θ)|ti] =
∑
t−i,θ
pi(t−i, θ|ti)(ui(1S E∗−i (t−i)∪{i}, θ) − ui(1S E∗−i (t−i), θ))
≥ 1
λi
∑
t−i,θ
pi(t−i, θ|ti)(v(1S E∗−i (t−i)∪{i}, θ) − v(1S E∗−i (t−i), θ)) ≥ 0
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by (C5), which implies that E∗ is an f-evident event; that is, E∗ ⊆ CBf(E). Observe that
0 ≤
∑
t,θ
pi(t, θ)v(1S E∗ (t), θ) −
∑
t,θ
pi(t, θ)v(1S E(t), θ)
=
∑
t∈E\E∗,θ∈Θ
pi(t, θ)(v(1S E∗ (t), θ) − v(1, θ)) +
∑
t∈T\E,θ∈Θ
pi(t, θ)(v(1S E∗ (t), θ) − v(1S E(t), θ))
≤(pi(E) − pi(E∗))c1 + (1 − pi(E))c2,
where
c1 = sup
t∈E∩T ∗,S,I
∑
θ
pi(θ|t)(v(1S , θ) − v(1, θ)) = −M(v, pi, E) < 0,
c2 = sup
S⊆S ′,I,θ∈Θ
v(1S , θ) − v(1S ′ , θ) ≥ 0.
Thus,
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ pi(E∗) ≥ 1 − (1 − c2/c1)(1 − pi(E)) = 1 − κ(v, pi, E)(1 − pi(E)).
If M∗(v, pi) > 0, then M(v, pi, E) ≥ M∗(v, pi) > 0 for all E ∈ T , so
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ 1 − κ(v, pi, E)(1 − pi(E)) ≥ 1 − κ∗(v, pi)(1 − pi(E)).
If M∗∗(v) > 0, then M∗(v, pi) ≥ M∗∗(v) > 0, so
pi(CBf(E)) ≥ 1 − κ∗(v, pi)(1 − pi(E)) ≥ 1 − κ∗∗(v)(1 − pi(E)),
which completes the proof. □
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